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ABSTRACT
The failure of protective systems can be catastrophic, and has its origin in manage-
ment. Yet, most engineering works regarding protective systems focus on their physical
components. Historically, protective systems have relied on a document-based approach,
which implies handling several disjointed artifacts that are expensive to maintain and have
a high potential for inconsistency and obsolescence.
We present a framework that embeds management and governance in protective sys-
tems and harmonizes regulations, theories, and inconsistent industry guidelines. It pio-
neers the modeling of protective systems according to the tenors of model-based systems
engineering (MBSE), which significantly reduces the pitfalls of its document-based coun-
terpart. It provides a realistic approach to manage multiple aspects of change, and offers
traceability, simulation, and visualization capabilities.
First, we sketched a conceptual model that encompasses the physical components,
management system, policy, laws and regulation, stakeholders and lifecycle, and stresses
the importance of understanding the interactions among elements and their dynamic na-
ture. Then, we used it as a baseline to develop the structure and behavior of our comput-
erized model in SysML.
Our MBSE framework advances the state of the art in safety-critical protective systems
by integrating management and governance, and offering further capabilities inherent to
the MBSE approach. It is suitable for combined design, operation, and regulation; it re-
duces the cost of maintenance of its artifacts; and it offers tools for simulation, impact
analysis, and management of change. It supports shared governance and mitigates infor-
mation asymmetry.
Potential users include both enterprises and regulators from the chemical process safety
ii
industry and the energy sector, and any other agents invested in the design and manage-
ment of protective systems.
The model of protective systems developed in this research conforms to the standards
issued by the Object Management Group (OMG) and the International Council on Sys-
tems Engineering (INCOSE). We believe that it may constitute a beginning point in the
development of more sophisticated standards and both prescriptive and performance-based
regulation for protective systems, intended to prevent catastrophic failures. It may also
help regulators to synthesize and disseminate information, as they serve as an interface
and mediator between companies and the general public.
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NOMENCLATURE
ACT Activity Diagram
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BDD Block Definition Diagram
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MBSE Model-Based Systems Engineering
MOC Management Of Change
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NGOs Non-Governmental Organizations
OMG Object Management Group
OOSEM Object-Oriented Systems Engineering Method
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration
PAR Parametric Diagram
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PKG Package Diagram
PRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment
PSM Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous
Chemicals
QRA Quantitative Risk Assessment
REQ Requirements Diagram
RFC Request For Change
RMP Risk Management Plan
SD Sequence Diagram
SE Systems Engineering
SoaML Service Oriented Architecture Modeling Language
STM State Machine Diagram
STUK Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (in Finland)
SysML Systems Modeling Language
SYSMOD Weilkiens System Modeling
TRI Toxic Release Inventory
UML Unified Modeling Language
UPDM Unified Profile for DoDAF/MOD
U.S. United States
U.S.NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
US$ United States Dollar
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Statement of purpose
The design and operation of protective systems in safety-critical enterprises is com-
plicated by the diversity of technologies, stakeholders, and managers. Hence, developing
design and operations protocols that advance the efficacy of protective systems remains a
formidable engineering challenge. Catastrophic failures of protective systems have their
origin in management failure: failure to manage design, operations and maintenance, and
their multiple forms of change.
Historically, protective systems have relied on a document-based approach, which im-
plies handling a large number of disjoint artifacts. Maintaining those artifacts is expensive,
time consuming, and has a high potential for inconsistency and obsolescence, aggravating
the problem of deficient management of change (MOC). MBSE is a relatively new con-
cept, which emerged within the last decade in the aerospace industry. Among its benefits,
it significantly reduces the limitations inherent to its document-based counterpart. It has
been successfully applied in other technologies, but not yet in protective systems.
We introduce the application of modern principles of MBSE to protective systems,
provide a framework for their management and governance throughout their lifecycle, and
offer tools beneficial in the MOC.
1.2 Research contributions
This research work presents a framework that embeds governance in protective sys-
tems, and harmonizes regulations, theories, and inconsistent industry guidelines. It pio-
neers the modeling of protective systems according to the tenors of MBSE. It provides a
realistic approach to manage multiple aspects of change, and offers traceability, simula-
1
tion, and visualization capabilities.
1.3 Roadmap to this dissertation
This dissertation is divided in five major sections. Section 1 gives an overview of the
problem and its importance, summarizes some of the related existing work and gaps, and
explains the role of protection in mitigating moral hazard. Section 2 provides a frame-
work for the MBSE approach followed in this research and the current characterization
and management of protective systems, as well as a literature review on the topics covered
in the introduction. Section 3 presents a conceptual model of protective systems, describ-
ing its main components, and stresses the need to understand the interactions among the
elements and their dynamic nature. Section 4 describes the model product of this research
and its capabilities, and Section 5 concludes with a description of future work and further
challenges.
1.4 Overview of the problem and its importance
1.4.1 Historical catastrophic events where protective systems failed and third par-
ties were affected
Every year safety-critical incidents happen in various types of industries throughout
the world. While many events are considered “near misses” as they result in no damages,
others have significant costs beyond the business interruption losses1, including property
damages, environmental damages, and injuries, or even fatalities, among both plant work-
ers and civilians who may or may not be aware of the risks imposed on them. Therefore,
they have economic and moral implications.
1In the energy sector, business interruption claims after losses are typically two or three times the size of
the property-loss value, but can be much higher [57].
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In the last few decades, various incidents with major consequences to the enterprise
and its near -and not so near- neighbors have taken place: nuclear disasters, as those in
Three-Mile Island (1979)2, Chernobyl (1986)3, Fukushima (2011)4; toxic vapor releases,
as those in Seveso, Italy (1976)5, Bhopal, India (1984)6; explosions in the petrochemical
industry, as those in San Juan Ixhuatepec, Mexico (1984)7, are examples of that.
Each of the 100 largest property-damage losses that have occurred in the hydrocarbon
industry from 1974 to 2015 had a value, in 2015 U.S. dollars8, of more than US$130
million, and they have a total accumulated value of over US$33 billion [57]. Although
many other incidents with significantly less property-damage share their root causes, all
of the 100 largest losses were due to a simultaneous failure of various prevention and
mitigation layers in the protective process-safety management system [56]. Hence, the
failure of protective systems is the real cause of catastrophes.
2The incident at the Three Mile Island Unit 2 nuclear power plant in Middletown, Pennsylvania, led
to no immediate deaths or injuries to plant workers or members of the nearby community [44], and the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission estimated that approximately one additional cancer in the area would result
from it [85]. However, it affected 195,000 residents living within 32 km, who were evacuated voluntarily,
highlighted challenges such as evacuation of hospitals and nursing homes [34], and resulted in damages
requiring an estimated $1 billion for cleanup costs alone, of which only $300 million were covered by
insurance [45]. The cleanup effort took nearly 14 years to complete [85].
3In the Chernobyl disaster more than 30 people were killed immediately, and 135,000 people in the
surrounding 20-mile radius had to be evacuated [44]. Other sources report that 115,000 residents were
evacuated in 1986, 220,000 subsequently evacuated by 1992, and 270,000 lived in contaminated area. 134
workers developed acute radiation syndrome, an increased incidence of thyroid cancer in children living
nearby was observed, and long-term psychosocial effects occurred [34].
4An analysis of the societal consequences of this incident, including the need for decontamination, return
of evacuees, health concerns and societal costs can be found in [90]. Health effects are further explained in
[34].
5Over 250 cases of chloracne were reported, over 600 people were evacuated (several days after the
release), and an additional 2,000 people were given blood tests [19].
6With more than 2000 civilian casualties [19].
7The aftermath includes 500-600 deaths, 5,000-7,000 severe injuries, 10,000-60,000 people made home-
less, 31 million dollars of damages, and the destruction of 1/3 of the LPG supply to Mexico City [1].
8Values represent the amount of the loss at the time of the loss, converted to US$, using the exchange
rate at the time of the loss, and inflated to December 2015 values.
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1.4.2 The real cause of protective system failure is management failure
Behind protective systems failure there is management failure: faulty designs, careless
operation by personnel not properly trained or with excessive workload, infrequent inspec-
tions, lack of preventive and corrective maintenance, lack of redundancies where needed,
the use of incompatible equipment, materials or protocols after a poorly planned change,
improper resource allocation, and many other issues that can cause a major incident in
safety-critical companies, are originated in management.
Management is either alluded to or explicitly mentioned in the definitions of protective
system9, instrumented protective systems (IPS)10, and protection layer11, with keywords
such as “implemented”, “design and managed”, and “supported by a management sys-
tem”, between the list of their various physical components and their purpose of preserv-
ing safety. Hence, protective systems and protection layers are more than simply their
physical components.
While the physical components can fail and are expected to wear out at some point,
despite the efforts in science and engineering12, it is in the management dimension where
the efficacy of protective systems truly resides. As Trevor Kletz, the ‘founding father’
of inherent safety remarks, “it isn’t what you expect, but it is what you inspect”. Man-
agement is responsible for conducting periodic audits and inspections to the facilities, the
9Protective systems are a collection of means or devices implemented to achieve or maintain a safer
state of a system when unacceptable operating conditions are detected, to reduce the risk of an identified
hazardous event [13].
10IPS are protective systems composed of a separate and independent combination of sensors, logic
solvers, final elements, and support systems that are designed and managed to achieve a specified integrity
level. They are used to reduce the process risk related to health and safety effects, environmental impacts,
loss of property, and business interruption costs [13].
11A protection layer is “a physical entity supported by a management system, which is capable of pre-
venting a hazardous event from propagating into an undesired consequence” [13].
12A significant portion of the work in engineering research associated to protective systems focuses on
the physical components (e.g. the development of more resistant materials, improvements in the design
of mechanical and electrical components, more accurate electronic devices, etc.). The one that impacts
directly the management systems behind them, can be within, but also goes beyond the domain of industrial
engineering, as it is not only related to maximizing machinery uptime, optimal maintenance policies and
broader areas of decision analysis and operations research.
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equipment and the procedures, scheduling maintenance and repairs, determining where
redundancies are needed, designing and implementing safety programs to identify, elimi-
nate, and ideally prevent safety hazards. “A good management process includes deciding
what needs to be done, doing it, documenting that it has been done, and studying these
results and improving the process” [19].
From an equipment perspective, the effectiveness of independent protection layers
(IPLs) is measured by their functionality, integrity, reliability, and from a human factors
perspective; but the IPLs effectiveness is limited by the management system used to en-
sure compliance with practices and procedures [79]. Yet, the management and governance
dimensions are often overlooked, or not well integrated, in the existing characterizations
of protective systems, oriented towards their physical components.
1.4.3 Challenges in the management of protective systems
Recognizing that the failure of the protective systems is the real cause of catastrophes,
and that system failure is ultimately management failure, managing protective systems
presents many challenges. These challenges include:
1.4.3.1 Lack of historical data
The lack of historical data on protective systems failure complicates analysis. On the
one hand, it is desirable not to have any kind of protective system failure ever, due to
the high consequence severity of such events. Very infrequent failures implies that major
losses rarely occur. On the other hand, in order to conduct diverse statistical analyses13,
many data points are needed. Without large sample sizes, the results can be invalid or
13In [17] the authors used detailed data analysis including chi-square tests and proportional analysis to
investigate the impact of the new OSHA crane and derricks regulations on the frequency of crane malfunc-
tions or misuses that result on fatalities and injuries. While their research relates to impact analysis, safety
regulation and risk mitigation, it is applicable to incidents in construction sites, not to the failure of protective
systems in safety-critical companies.
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misleading, even after using corrections. Furthermore, the scarce existing data may not
always be comparable. Even when data are collected using an acknowledged failure mode
classification14, “the data may lack relevant information about the associated safety system
and thus be valid for a specific system only, not for generic equipment and systems in
general” [76].
1.4.3.2 Successful measures versus simply good luck
Given the distinction between an absence of initiating causes and a failure of protective
systems, it is very hard to tell if the lack of critical incidents is due to success in preventive
and protective measures, or merely good luck. It could be the case that the protective
system was down or would have failed during a time when, fortunately, no initiating causes
were present so no harm was done. Frequent testing often implies interruptions to the
normal operation of the protective system or the critical technology behind it, and for
this reason an apparent solution to confirm the system readiness is not always easy to
implement.
Also, since they are not always used, protective systems are often unnoticed, until
they are needed and fail. While many people would agree that it is always better to have
working protective systems and never need to use them, rather than constantly need their
use, their relatively low frequency of use and its silent, unnoticed nature are perhaps some
of the reasons why, as public choice analysis show, “politicians tend to underinvest in
precautionary efforts since these do not lead to substantial political gains during the term
of office of the particular politician”, whereas providing ex post compensation generates
them high political rewards [27].
14Such as that adopted from the International Electrotechnical Commission standard 61508, discussed in
[76].
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1.4.3.3 Shared governance
IPS have many owners and operators from different disciplines, within and beyond the
premises of the company, thus lacking central direction. They range from the managers
at all levels and industrial organizations, to governments and regulators, first responders,
and civilian organizations. Each stakeholder has a particular concern and viewpoint, often
related to specific parts of the system that can be affected by others, and perhaps their
participation occurs at different points in time. Therefore, besides their visible physical
dimension, IPS have management and governance dimensions, and present the additional
challenge of shared governance.
1.4.3.4 The dynamic nature of protective systems
Furthermore, IPS are dynamic, constantly evolving. Changes in technology, policy
modifications, and personnel turnover at all levels, stress the need for an appropriate MOC,
given the impact they could have in other parts of the system and the system as a whole.
Not only do protective systems change whenever modifications to the protective system
itself are performed, they need to be adapted as the critical technologies or the procedures
that they are intended to protect change. In all cases, except for the simplest replacements
in kind, the respective changes need to be assessed and approved prior to their implemen-
tation, and must be properly documented and informed to the pertinent stakeholders, who
might require training as a result.
1.4.3.5 Interrelated system elements
One of the key issues that makes both shared governance and MOC so challenging
is that the elements of protective systems are interrelated. Their parts and functions may
be compartmentalized among the different types of owners and operators due to special-
ization, or for security reasons. However, changes in one part can affect others, and the
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effects may not always be easily noticeable to those who originate them. Protective sys-
tems are characterized by high intricacy and complexity15, therefore, they require means
and approaches to understand, assess, and keep track of changes and their possible effects
in other parts of the system, and in the system as a whole.
1.4.3.6 Safety is an emergent property
This is especially important, because safety is an emergent property, which means that
it arises from the interactions among the components at a lower level of the system. Simply
analyzing the safety of each one of the individual components of a larger system overlooks
the hazards that emerge once those components interact. Therefore, safety must always be
analyzed top-down, for the integrated system and its subsystems [51].
1.4.4 Introduction to systems engineering and MBSE versus the document-based
approach
Needless to say, protective systems are systems16. IPS are engineered systems, since
they are technologically enabled, complex, dynamic, have multiple interactions with nat-
ural systems (e.g. nuclear, chemical, ecosystems) and human systems (e.g. governmental,
urban, community) and deal with multiple aspects of uncertainty. Given the multiple chal-
lenges they face, they call for a systems engineering17 approach.
Systems engineering approaches can be either document-based, or model-based (or
a hybrid of both). In the traditionally used document-based approach, there are many
15Intricacy refers to the number of different elements in a system, and complexity refers to the number
and type of relationships between elements in a system [89]. Complexity is often viewed as a characteristic
of systems in which no single individual is able to fully understand the whole system and all its parts.
16A system is defined as “a combination of interacting elements organized to achieve one or more stated
purposes” (ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288). INCOSE defines it as “an integrated set of elements, sub systems, or
assemblies that accomplish a defined objective”, and remarks that “these elements include products (hard-
ware, software, firmware), processes, people, information, techniques, facilities, services, and other support
elements” [87].
17There are many definitions of Systems Engineering, as it refers to a perspective, a process, and a pro-
fession. See Section 2 for some of them.
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disjoint artifacts in the form of text documents, spreadsheets, diagrams, and presentations.
Maintaining them as the system changes is expensive and time consuming, and they can
easily become inconsistent and obsolete. However, in the model-based approach, the main
artifact is a system model, which is integrated, coherent and consistent [22], and where
the emphasis is placed on evolving and refining the model using model-based methods
and tools [30]. Despite all its benefits, the process safety industry is not currently taking
advantage of all the capabilities that MBSE has to offer.
Systems engineering is interdisciplinary in nature, a feature that is necessary in the de-
sign and management of protective systems. Among its different approaches, MBSE has
several advantages, especially in terms of maintenance, simulation and impact analysis
capabilities. One of its modeling languages, the systems modeling language (SysML) al-
lows to graphically represent the structure, behavior and requirements of a system model.
This could help us to provide many views of the protective system, at different levels of
granularity, and integrate the protection layers, but also their lifecycle, their stakeholders
with their respective viewpoints, and other features of protective systems, in order to char-
acterize them holistically. With the appropriate software tools and interfaces, methods and
languages, in principle, it is possible to use that system model to perform simulation and
impact analysis, and offer perhaps better ways to manage protective systems from the in-
side, but also from the outside of the company. Thus, such system model may constitute a
beneficial tool for regulators, civilian organizations and near neighbors to mitigate moral
hazard.
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1.5 Summary of the state of the art and challenges
1.5.1 Many research works in engineering focus on physical components, not in
management and governance
The simplest form of safety instrumented systems follows the classic model of sensor -
logic solver - final element: sensors to detect the hazard, a logic solver to decide whether an
emergency shutdown is needed, and final elements to isolate the process from the hazard.
Therefore, it is not surprising that many research works in engineering focus on the phys-
ical components of protective systems. Some recent examples of that include studies on
the way component arrangement affects the performance of complex safety instrumented
systems18, improved dependability through the integration of intelligent sensors19, or even
how plants should choose the proper sensors for their protective systems20. Several other
works relate to probabilistic methods to estimate the probability of failure on demand of
the protection layers, or to the measurement of the rate of spurious activation or spuri-
ous trip rate21. However, there are fewer research works in engineering that focus on the
management and governance of protective systems. Some of them are related to the op-
timization of proof testing policies for safety instrumented systems22; administrative and
regulatory issues, including contractual provisions for the supply of safety instrumented
systems23; or monitoring human and organizational factors influencing common-cause
failures of safety-instrumented systems during the operational phase24.
18See [41].
19See [60].
20See [58].
21See [43].
22See [80], [53], and [52].
23See [21].
24See [66].
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1.5.2 LOPA has deficiencies
Protective systems are often represented by a group of protection layers intended to
reduce the frequency or consequence severity of hazardous events. Similar to the Swiss
Cheese Model of Accident25 Causation, proposed by Dante Orlandella and James T. Rea-
son of the University of Manchester, Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) is one of the
tools used for analyzing and assessing process risk that bases its methodology on this
characterization.
LOPA is a simplified form of quantitative risk analysis that uses order-of-magnitude
categories for initiating event frequency, consequence severity and probability of failure
of IPLs to analyze and assess the risk of one or more incident scenarios [16]. The pri-
mary purpose of LOPA is to determine if there are sufficient layers of protection against
a hazardous scenario to meet an organization’s risk tolerance criteria. Since no layer is
perfectly effective, sufficient protection layers must be provided to render the risk of the
incident tolerable [12], [24]. For a further explanation of LOPA, see section 2.2.1.
While in principle it seems appropriate to model protective systems geographically
or chronologically, based on the physical layers designed to prevent, and ultimately re-
spond to a loss of containment due to an initiating cause, this representation does not
show who the owners and operators of each layer are or who is accountable for them;
therefore, it does not encompass management issues. Furthermore, it requires protection
layers to be independent of the initiating cause and of each other, which in many cases
is hard to achieve, particularly when they are managed by the same agent, and thus sub-
ject to common-cause failures. The assumption of independence also overlooks possible
interactions among non-adjacent layers.
25The term “accident” is often found in the literature, even in the name of particular models or frame-
works. Therefore, it appears as such in portions of this dissertation that refer to them. Nevertheless, it is
worth mentioning that, given its connotation as something that happens unexpectedly, unintentionally, or by
chance, we would rather use the broader term “incident”, which does not suppress neither the preventable
nature of the event nor the accountability of those who contribute to it.
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1.5.3 The guidelines from the industry are document-based
Some well know professional institutions, experts in the topic, have issued several pub-
lications related to process safety. An outstanding example of this is the Center for Chemi-
cal Process Safety (CCPS) of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE), with
a series of over 100 books intended to provide the industry with guidelines. Among them,
we have: Guidelines for Safe and Reliable Instrumented Protective Systems [13], pub-
lished in 2007; Guidelines for enabling conditions and conditional modifiers in layer of
protection analysis (LOPA), [16], published in 2014; Plant guidelines for technical man-
agement of chemical process safety [10], with a revised edition published in 1995; Guide-
lines for the management of change for process safety [14], published in 2008; Guidelines
for auditing process safety management systems [15], published in 2011; Guidelines for
Implementing Process Safety Management Systems [9], published in 1994; and Guidelines
for integrating process safety management, environment, safety, health, and quality [11],
published in 1996.
Although these works are remarkable, given that they are document-based, as tech-
nology evolves and policies change, they can become outdated. Furthermore, there are
inconsistencies among them26, which makes the integration of two or more of the aspects
treated in different publications more difficult. Following a model-based approach would
be beneficial to address both limitations.
26For example, in [13], the book is organized using a project lifecycle with six major phases: (1) Planning,
(2) Risk Assessment, (3) Design, (4) Engineering, Installation, Commissioning and Validation, (5) Opera-
tional and Mechanical Integrity, and (6) Continuous Improvement; whereas in [14], they choose to use the
following definitions for lifecycle stages: (1) Process development, (2) Detailed design, (3) Construction
and startup, (4) Extended shutdowns, (5) Operating lifetime, and (6) Decommissioning.
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1.5.4 The paradigms that link management to safety do not provide a system model
suitable for analyses and simulation
The paradigm of High Reliability Organizations (HROs), by Todd LaPorte, Gene
Rochlin, and Karlene Roberts, of the University of California, Berkeley, has emerged from
the field of organization theory, linking management to safety27. Although it offers best
practices to take into account, it does not encompass regulatory issues, and ultimately it
does not provide a model suitable for simulation and impact analysis. Many efforts derived
from HROs have been recently conducted to improve emergency response, which consti-
tutes the final, outer layer of protective systems, and concentrates a significant amount of
external stakeholders, but they are often disjoint with respect to the inner layers.
In short, many research works in engineering focus on physical components, but not in
management and governance. The characterization of protective systems as a group of pro-
tection layers used in LOPA overlooks their owners and operators, as well as management
issues that may lead to common-cause failures, or interactions among non-adjacent lay-
ers, and thus violate the independence core attribute. The guidelines issued by regulators
and industrial associations that do encompass management present inconsistencies among
themselves, and are in the form of text-based artifacts, which brings several pitfalls with
regard to their maintenance and integration. Other paradigms emerged from academia that
link management to safety do not encompass regulatory issues, do not provide a model
suitable for simulation and impact analysis, and in some cases simply focus on the outer
layer of protective systems.
27See section 2.3.2 for further details.
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1.6 A regulatory perspective
1.6.1 Moral hazard
There is no question that chemical manufacturing industries, companies in the en-
ergy sector, nuclear power generation, and many other technology-based enterprises bring
countless benefits to humanity. They employ people, pay taxes, and provide us with useful
goods and services. In return, in many cases, their shareholders profit. However, the ac-
tivities these enterprises perform also come with risks28. Nuclear and radiation disasters,
toxic material releases, fires, and explosions, are examples of obvious hazards inherent to
these companies. Despite their relatively low frequencies of occurrence, the consequence
severity of these incidents can be major when they take place. Furthermore, the costs of the
consequences of these undesirable events are faced by many more stakeholders, internal
and external, than merely the shareholders who profit under more favorable circumstances.
Therefore, all the above mentioned companies have in common a hazard that is of major
importance in this dissertation: moral hazard.
According to Paul Krugman, Nobel Laureate in Economics, the term “moral hazard”
has its origins in the insurance industry, and eventually came to refer to “any situation in
which one person makes the decision about how much risk to take, while someone else
bears the cost if things go badly” [47]. A safety-critical enterprise poses a threat to public
safety, as critical incidents could cause third party liabilities or losses, property damages,
fatalities, and permanent injuries among its neighbors29, as well as business partners and
28We can find in [74] many thoughts on risk and the perception of risks (e.g. the splashy and dreadful
versus the ordinary, voluntary versus involuntary, moral versus immoral, detectable versus undetectable, nat-
ural versus man-made) from a variety of authors, followed by a comparison with other much more hazardous
activities that yet seem to have a better reputation or acceptance among many people, in order to recognize
why these industries are often target of misperceptions.
29In the U.S. code of federal regulation (14 CFR 401.5), “a safety-critical system, subsystem, condition,
event, operation, process or item is one whose proper recognition, control, performance, or tolerance is
essential to system operation such that it does not jeopardize public safety. Something that is safety critical
item creates a safety hazard or provides protection from a safety hazard” [83].
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financers.
Besides ending up bearing the costs of safety-critical incidents, neighbors and other
parties face another disadvantage related to moral hazard: information asymmetry. In
most cases, safety-critical companies possess more knowledge and information about their
processes, the activities they perform, the properties of the materials they handle, and
ultimately, the risks associated to their operation, than the neighbors and other third parties
on which risks are imposed. In other words, the latter might have made decisions while
misunderstanding, misestimating, or being unaware of the risks they could face.
1.6.2 The role of regulators and their needs
Safety-critical companies impose poorly understood risks to their near neighbors and
have the potential to cause fatalities, injuries, and large property and environmental dam-
ages, thus creating moral hazard. Regulators and judges play an important role in the
mitigation of moral hazard, inducing preventive and protective measures through the use
of civil liability and safety regulation in its various forms: compliance-based regulation30
(a.k.a prescriptive regulation), performance-based regulation31 (e.g. the U.S. Nuclear Reg-
ulatory Commission (U.S.NRC) advocating for the use of Probabilistic Risk Assessment
(PRA) methods [86]), and process-based regulation32 (a.k.a. integral supervision). Given
30“This approach typically involves the regulator providing prescriptive standards and requirements - the
same for every plant - for operators to follow. In this regime, inspection and enforcement are largely a matter
of verifying compliance with these rules and penalising non-compliance” [40].
31Performance-based regulation is “a regulatory approach that focuses on desired, measurable outcomes,
rather than prescriptive processes, techniques, or procedures. Performance-based regulation leads to defined
results without specific direction regarding how those results are to be obtained. At the NRC, performance-
based regulatory actions focus on identifying performance measures that ensure an adequate safety margin
and offer incentives for licensees to improve safety without formal regulatory intervention by the agency”
[84]. “In this approach, licensees are required to comply with safety objectives, but have some flexibility to
decide how they achieve that. Safety performance indicators are used by the regulator to observe trends in
safety, and inspection activities focus on these indicators” [40].
32“The process approach focuses on the organizational systems that the facility has developed to assure the
ongoing safe operation from the perspective of the facility’s internal logic (...) It demonstrates to the regulator
that they have taken a very rigorous approach to the design, implementation, and ongoing evaluation of their
key processes and that they are alert to opportunities to improve their systems.” [40].
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the importance of their activities in order to preserve public safety, mitigate moral haz-
ard and asymmetry of information; the number of agents that interact with them, and the
financial and informational constraints they face, regulators require tools, methods, and
theories that suit needs specific to their mission33.
1.7 Conclusion to the section
In summary, the failure of protective systems, which can be catastrophic, has its origin
in management failure; but managing protective systems is extremely challenging. This is
not only because of the scarcity of historical data to analyze, and goes beyond the uncer-
tainty about whether the lack of critical incidents is due to their proper functioning, or just
a fortunate absence of initiating causes while they would otherwise have failed. It implies
a shared governance, given their many owners and operators over time. It demands effec-
tive MOC, because of the dynamic nature of technology and human resources. There are
multiple interactions among their elements; and since safety is an emergent property, the
safety of their individual components does not guarantee the safety of the overall system.
At the same time, regulators need to have tools and methods to mitigate moral hazard,
reduce the asymmetry of information, and induce preventive and protective measures in
safety-critical enterprises.
The existing related research works in engineering focus on physical components and
do not integrate management and governance; those issued by industrial associations (e.g.
AIChE/CCPS), regulatory bodies (e.g. OSHA, EPA)34, and those that emerged from other
fields (e.g. HROs), offer guidelines and best practices that involve management, but do not
provide the benefits of a model, and follow a document-based approach. This traditionally
used document-based approach is expensive, time consuming, and prone to errors that lead
33See Section 2.4.2 for a literature review on this topic.
34Discussed in Section 2.
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to inconsistency obsolescence. MBSE is a relatively new approach, not yet used in protec-
tive systems, that significantly reduces the limitations of its document-based counterpart,
and has other benefits beyond maintenance, including traceability and impact analysis ca-
pabilities.
Our work presents a framework that introduces governance in protective systems, and
pioneers the modeling of the multiple dimensions of protective systems according to the
tenors of MBSE. It harmonizes regulations, theories, and inconsistent industry guidelines;
provides a realistic approach to manage multiple aspects of change; and offers traceability
and visualization capabilities.
The next section consists of a literature review and a theoretical framework for our
work. Then, in section 3 we explain our conceptual model of protective systems. Later,
in section 4, we develop our system model based on it. In section 5, we conclude with a
description of future work and further challenges.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW
In this section we provide a theoretical framework regarding the approach suggested
and used in this research (MBSE), the current characterization of protective systems and
process safety management. Then, we perform a literature review on some of the topics
encompassed in the introduction in order to explain them further, support the statements
presented there, and establish a baseline for our work.
2.1 MBSE
2.1.1 What is MBSE?
There are many definitions of Systems Engineering (SE) in the literature.
To INCOSE, SE is “an interdisciplinary approach and means to enable the realization
of successful systems. It focuses on defining customer needs and required functionality
early in the development cycle, documenting requirements, and then proceeding with de-
sign synthesis and system validation while considering the complete problem: operations,
cost and schedule, performance, training and support, test, manufacturing, and disposal.
SE considers both the business and the technical needs of all customers with the goal of
providing a quality product that meets the user needs” [87].
According to Howard Eisner, SE is “an iterative process of top-down synthesis, devel-
opment, and operation of a real-world system that satisfies, in a near optimal manner, the
full range of requirements for the system” [25].
To the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), SE is “a methodical, disciplined approach
for the design, realization, technical management, operations, and retirement of a system”
[64].
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To the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), SE is “an interdisci-
plinary management process to evolve and verify an integrated, life cycle balanced set of
system solutions that satisfy customer needs” [62].
To the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), SE is “a discipline that concentrates
on the design and application of the whole (system) as distinct from the parts. It involves
looking at a problem in its entirety, taking into account all the facets and all the variables
and relating the social to the technical aspect” [28]
SE can be seen as a perspective, as a process, and as a profession. It includes tech-
nical and management processes, and constitutes an effective way to manage complexity
and change [87]. In SE, the functional and performance requirements for a system are
determined, documented, and verified [2].
SE approaches can be either document-based, or model-based (or a hybrid of both).
The document-based approach involves many disjoint artifacts, which are expensive and
time consuming to maintain, and can easily become inconsistent and obsolete. In the
model-based approach, the main artifact is an integrated, coherent, and consistent system
model [22], and the emphasis is placed on evolving and refining the model using model-
based methods and tools [30].
MBSE is “the formalized application of modeling to support system requirements,
design, analysis, verification and validation activities beginning in the conceptual design
phase and continuing throughout development and later life cycle phases” [36]. According
to INCOSE’s vision of SE, “MBSE is expected to replace the document-centric approach
that has been practiced by systems engineers in the past and influence the future practice
of systems engineering by being fully integrated into the definition of systems engineering
processes” [36].
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2.1.2 Benefits of MBSE
The main aim of modelling is to address the three evils of engineering: complexity,
lack of understanding, and poor communications [37]. The purposes for modeling a sys-
tem may include: characterize an existing system, specify and design a new or modified
system, evaluate the system through system design trade-offs or impact assessments, and
train users on how to operate or maintain a system [30]. Some of the benefits associ-
ated with the application of effective MBSE are: automatic generation and maintenance
of system documents, complexity control and management, consistent and coherent views
across the whole system architecture, traceability between all the system artifacts, simpler
access to information, improved communication with a common language, and definitions
of all the relevant concepts and terms used, and increased understanding of the system
[37]. Besides these advantages, with the MBSE approach, the diagrams and autogener-
ated texts are merely views of the underlying system model, not the model itself [22]. Just
as the pictures of an object taken from different angles can show its different features, not
necessarily all at once, the distinct diagrams in the MBSE approach can show the structure,
the behavior, and the requirements of the system model, at different levels of granularity,
in an integrated way, while just one diagram does not necessarily show all the characteris-
tics of the system model, as “no single diagram can communicate all aspects of the system
or architecture” [2].
MBSE has three pillars: modeling languages, modeling methods, and modeling tools.
Modeling languages constitute a standardized medium to communicate the elements of
the model and the relationships among them. Modeling methods are a documented set of
design tasks to ensure model consistency. Modeling tools, unlike diagramming tools that
merely create shapes, allow to create a model with elements, relationships, and views, in
which whenever an element on a diagram is modified, all the other diagrams that display
that same element are updated instantaneously. One modeling language that is commonly
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used by MBSE practitioners is the Systems Modeling Language (SysML); however, there
are other graphical languages, such as UML, UPDM, BPMN,MARTE, SoaML, and IDEF,
and text modeling languages, like Verilog and Modelica, that can be used in systems engi-
neering. The methods include the INCOSE Object-Oriented Systems Engineering Method
(OOSEM), the Weilkiens System Modeling (SYSMOD) method, and the IBM Telelogic
Harmony-SE; and there exist a reasonable number of either free or commercial-grade mod-
eling tools in the market, such as the following products and trademarks: Agilian, Artisan
Studio, Enterprise Architect, Cameo Systems Modeler, Rhapsody, UModel, Modelio, and
Papyrus [22].
2.1.3 What is SysML?
SysML is a general-purpose modeling language that supports the analysis, specifica-
tion, design, verification, and validation of complex systems [30]. It provides graphical
representations with a semantic foundation for modeling system requirements, structure,
behavior, allocations, and constraints on system properties to support engineering analysis
[63]. It originated from an initiative between OMG1 and INCOSE in 2003, to adapt the
Unified Modeling Language (UML) for systems engineering applications [37].
SysML currently has nine types of diagrams that are used to represent the structure,
the behavior, and the requirements of the system. Figure 2.1 shows their taxonomy.
Block definition diagrams (BDD) are used to display elements that define the types of
things that can exist in an operational system and the relationships between those elements.
Internal block diagrams (IBD) show the connections between the internal parts of a block
and the interfaces between them. Parametric diagrams (PAR) are used to express how one
or more constraints, in the form of equations and inequalities, are bound to the properties of
1OMG is a not-for-profit computer industry standards consortium of computer industry companies, gov-
ernment agencies, and academic institutions.
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Figure 2.1: SysML diagrams taxonomy. Source: [22]
a system. They support engineering analyses, including performance, reliability, and cost,
among others. Package diagrams (PKG) are used to display the way a model is organized
in the form of a package containment hierarchy. They may also show the model elements
that packages contain and the dependencies between packages and their contained model
elements. Requirements diagrams (REQ) are used to display requirements in the form
of texts, the relationships between requirements, e.g. containment, and the relationships
between requirements and the other model elements that satisfy, verify, and refine them.
Activity diagrams (ACT) are used to specify a behavior, with a focus on the flow of control
and the transformation of inputs into outputs through a sequence of actions. Sequence
diagrams (SD) are used to specify a behavior, with a focus on how the parts of a block
interact with one another via operation calls and asynchronous signals. State machine
diagrams (STM) are used to specify a behavior, with a focus on the set of states of a block
and the possible transitions between those states in response to event occurrences. Use
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case diagrams (UC) convey the actions or services that a system performs and the actors
that invoke and participate in them. [22]. The SysML specification can be found in [63].
2.2 LOPA, protective systems, and management of protective systems
2.2.1 Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA)
LOPA bases its methodology on the existence of a group of independent protection
layers which conform a basic representation of protective systems. In this sense, many
types of protective layers are possible [19]. Some of these layers may include: Process
design, basic process control systems, critical alarms and human intervention, safety in-
strumented functions, physical protection (relief devices), post-release physical protection
(dikes), plant emergency response, and community emergency response [19], [12]. In a
broader perspective, according to the CCPS of the AIChE, the layers of protection are: In-
herently safer design, control, supervisory, preventive, mitigative, barrier, limitation, and
response [13].
The inherently safer design layer seeks to reduce or eliminate hazardous events through
effective use of process technology, design methods, and/or operational techniques. The
control layer focuses on maintaining the process within the normal operating limits. The
supervisory layer and the preventive layer are designed to achieve or maintain a safe state
of the process to reduce the frequency of the hazardous event. The mitigative layer is de-
signed to reduce the frequency and/or consequence severity of the hazardous event. The
layer of barriers minimizes the consequence severity due to its physical design. The limi-
tation layer acts to reduce the consequence severity of the hazardous event. The response
layer notifies personnel and/or the community to shelter-in-place or to evacuate to safe
zones and musters emergency response personnel [13].
The main steps in LOPA, as described in [19], are the following:
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Figure 2.2: Protection layers. Source: [13]
Step 1 Identify the consequence to screen the scenarios.
Step 2 Select an incident scenario.
Step 3 Identify the initiating event of the scenario and determine the initiating event fre-
quency (events per year).
Step 4 Identify the IPLs and estimate the probability of failure on demand of each IPL.
Step 5 Estimate the risk of the scenario by mathematically combining the consequence,
initiating event, and IPL data.
Step 6 Evaluate the risk to reach a decision concerning the scenario.
The equation used for estimating the frequency of an incident scenario is:
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PFDij (2.1)
where
fCi is the mitigated consequence frequency for a specific consequence C for an initiat-
ing event i,
f Ii is the frequency of the initiating event i, and
PFDij is the probability of failure on demand of the jth IPL that protects against the
specific consequence and the specific initiating event i.
2.2.2 CCPS guidelines
In [13], the CCPS of the AIChE establishes a framework that can be used in the de-
sign and management of IPS throughout a projects life cycle, based on International Elec-
trotechnical Commission (IEC) and Instrumentation, Systems and Automation (ISA) stan-
dards, in order to achieve safe and reliable process operation. Besides the representation of
protective systems as a group of protection layers, such as those mentioned in section 1 and
illustrated in Figure 2.2, the guidelines provided in that publication include the following
characteristics of protective systems:
The core attributes of IPS are: independence, functionality, integrity, reliability, au-
ditability, access security, and management of change. Independence means that the per-
formance of a protection layer is not affected by the initiating cause of a hazardous event
or by the failure of other protection layers. Functionality refers to the required operation
of the protection layer in response to a hazardous event. Integrity relates to the risk reduc-
tion that can reasonably be expected given the protection layer’s design and management.
Reliability refers to the probability that a protection layer will operate as intended under
stated conditions for a specified time period. Auditability is the ability to inspect informa-
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tion, documents and procedures, which demonstrate the adequacy of and adherence to the
design, inspection, maintenance, testing, and operation practices used to achieve the other
core attributes. Access security refers to the use of administrative controls and physical
means to reduce the potential for unintentional or unauthorized changes. Management
of change is the formal process used to review, document, and approve modifications to
equipment, procedures, raw materials, processing conditions, etc., other than “replacement
in kind”, prior to implementation [13].
The stakeholders mentioned there are: management, process safety, process, instru-
mentation and electrical, operations, maintenance, and manufacturers. Management in-
cludes corporate and site organizations. It establishes policies related to safer and reliable
operation, and is responsible for the oversight of the management system. Process safety
includes environmental, health, and process safety management organizations, and is re-
sponsible for the process safety management. Process includes research and development,
process, and process control, and its role is to design and operate the processes. Instru-
mentation and electrical (I&E) includes I&E, process control and reliability, and its roles
encompass instrumentation and control design and implementation. Operations includes
process operations and operations management; as its name suggests, it is responsible for
the operation of the processes. Maintenance includes personnel from maintenance, pro-
cess control, I&E, and reliability (equipment). Its role is to inspect, test, and maintain the
equipment of the protective system. Manufacturers are any entity that develops, markets,
and sells a product to be used in the protective system [13].
Although the guidelines in [13] imply an inside-out approach to design, operate and
manage protective systems, there can also be an outside-in approach that gives more con-
sideration to the needs and concerns of the external stakeholders that these systems are
intended to protect. The behavioral theories of the firm suggest that businesses have mul-
tiple aims set by their different stakeholders, including workers, customers, local com-
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munities and pressure groups, such as environmental activists, not just their shareholders
and managers [32]. Besides the actively involved groups addressed in [13], in compa-
nies that perform safety-critical processes, their near neighbors are stakeholders who do
not necessarily profit from the companys operations, but could be affected in the event of
a protective system failure, and therefore their viewpoints should be taken into account.
Sometimes that happens indirectly, through the inputs of the legislators, which may or may
not overlap those of the internal policy makers in management or the process safety man-
agement organizations, and those from citizen participation groups and pressure groups.
The emergency responders who would act in such events, as well as the authorities and reg-
ulators who enforce their use and inspection, are also stakeholders we should not overlook.
Finally, their customers and vendors may also be affected due to business interruptions,
and therefore have a stake in protective systems as well. In that sense, these other groups
are considered in other publications of the CCPS. With regard to the people undertaking
management activities in process safety, in [9] the CCPS classifies them into four broad
groups: internal, intracompany, intermediaries, and external constituents. Internal peo-
ple include the facility management group, facility safety professionals, shift supervisors,
shop stewards, and employees. Intracompany people include the division president, other
facility managers, and facility safety professionals. The intermediaries are the union lead-
ers, and the regulatory authorities; and the external constituents include key customers,
local officials, community activists, and neighbors. Although the emergency responders
are not explicitly mentioned, except for the local officials, the last layer of protection in
[13], i.e. emergency response, includes their role.
In SE, the lifecycle refers to the entire spectrum of activity, from the identification
of needs to the system retirement and material disposal [5]. A generic system lifecycle
includes the stages of observation, failing/concern/opportunity awareness, development,
transition, operation, maintenance, enhancement, overhaul, decommission, and disposal.
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The development process encompasses the needs analysis, requirements definition, pre-
liminary design, detailed design, realization, integration and test, and implementation.
NASA divides the project lifecycle into the following phases: (Pre-Phase A) concept
studies, (A) concept and technology development, (B) preliminary design and technol-
ogy completion, (C) final design and fabrication, (D) system assembly, integration and
test, launch, (E) Operations and sustainment, and (F) Closeout [62]. Both lifecycle rep-
resentations follow a “cradle-to-grave” approach. On the other hand, the CCPS organizes
the protective management system lifecycle in seven major phases: (1) planning, (2) risk
assessment, (3) design, (4) engineering, (5) installation, commissioning, and validation,
(6) operational and mechanical integrity, and (7) continuous improvement [13]. While the
activities of decommission and disposal of worn out or obsolete materials and abandon-
ment of outdated practices are still implicit in the last two stages, this concept of lifecycle
phases is consistent with the evolving nature of protective systems, as a “cradle-to-cradle”
approach, which has been followed throughout this research.
2.2.3 OSHA PSM and EPA RMP
From the definition of protection layers2, and our previous discussion about the im-
portance of the management of protective systems, as well as the role of safety regulation,
it should be clear that, besides the physical components of the protection layers and the
stakeholders involved, management, governance, and regulation are essential.
In the U.S., the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) of the U.S.
Department of Labor, and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) are authorized by
the Congress to create and enforce regulation to protect people and the environment3.
2Protection layer: “a physical entity supported by a management system, which is capable of preventing
a hazardous event from propagating into an undesired consequence” [13].
3The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) also participates in these activities, but it is beyond the
scope of this research.
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After having proposed a standard on July 17, 1990, holding a hearing, and receiv-
ing more than 175 comments and almost 4,000 pages of testimony, as well as almost 60
post-hearing comments and briefs, on February 24, 1992, OSHA published the final rule
Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemicals (PSM)4. This standard em-
phasizes the management of hazards associated with highly hazardous chemicals and es-
tablishes a comprehensive management program that integrated technologies, procedures,
and management practices. It was developed after the Bhopal incident to prevent sim-
ilar events. The PSM standard has 14 major sections: employee participation, process
safety information, process hazard analysis, operating procedures, training, contractors,
pre-startup safety review, mechanical integrity, hot work permits, management of change,
incident investigations, emergency planning and response, audits, and trade secrets [19],
[82].
On June 20, 1996, the EPA published the Risk Management Plan (RMP) as a final
rule, aimed at decreasing the number and magnitude of releases of toxic and flammable
substances. The RMP is designed to protect off-site people and the environment, whereas
PSM is designed to protect on-site people [19]. The RMP has the following elements:
hazard assessment, prevention program, emergency response program, and documenta-
tion. The prevention program has 11 elements, compared to the 14 elements of the PSM
standard: process safety information, hazard evaluation, standard operating procedures,
training, pre-startup review, maintenance, management of change, accident5 investiga-
tions, emergency response, safety audits, and risk assessment [19].
Besides OSHA PSM and the very similar prevention program of EPA RMP, enforced
4The term “process” means “any activity involving a highly hazardous chemical including using, storing,
manufacturing, handling, or moving such chemicals at the site, or any combination of these activities. For
purposes of this definition, any group of vessels that are interconnected, and separate vessels located in a
way that could involve a highly hazardous chemical in a potential release, are considered a single process”
[82].
5See Footnote 25 on page 10.
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by the law, there are other (document-based) industry PSM frameworks. The CCPS model
of process safety management encompasses: accountability, objectives and goals, process
knowledge and documentation, capital project review and design procedures (for new or
existing plants, expansions, and acquisitions), process risk management, management of
change, process and equipment integrity, human factors, training and performance, in-
cident investigation, standards, codes, and laws, audits and corrective actions, and en-
hancement of process safety knowledge. The Chemical Manufacturers Association Pro-
cess Safety Management elements are: management leadership in process safety, process
safety management of technology, process safety management of facilities, and managing
personnel for process safety. The American Petroleum Institute Process Safety Manage-
ment elements are: process safety information, process hazard analysis, management of
change, operating procedures, safe6 work practices, training, assurance of the quality and
integrity of critical equipment, pre-startup safety review, emergency response and con-
trol, investigation of process-related incidents, and audit of process hazards management
systems [9].
2.3 Other related work
2.3.1 Rasmussen’s risk management framework
Rasmussen’s risk management framework considers socio-technical systems with sev-
eral actors, stressed by rapid technological change, a competitive environment, chang-
ing regulatory practices and public pressure. It suggests that risk management must be
modeled by cross-disciplinary studies, and requires a system-oriented approach based on
functional abstraction rather than structural decomposition [67].
6The term “safe” is commonly used, both in the industry and in the literature, and for that reason we
preserve it in referenced texts; however, since risk can be decreased, mitigated, and managed, but it cannot
be completely eliminated, we would rather use the term “safer” instead.
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Rasmussen’s framework, illustrated in Figure 2.3, has two components: a structural
hierarchy that describes the individuals and organizations in a system, and the dynamic
forces that can cause a complex socio-technical system to modify its structure and be-
havior over time [8]. The actors in this framework are depicted in levels: work, staff,
management, company, regulators and associations, and government. The related research
disciplines necessary for understanding risk factors vary at each level, and range from me-
chanical, chemical and electrical engineering; psychology, human factors, human-machine
interaction; industrial engineering, management and organization; economics, decision
theory, organizational sociology; to political science, law, economics and sociology. The
environmental stressors encompass a fast pace of technological change, changing com-
petency and levels of education, changing market conditions and financial pressure, and
changing political climate and public awareness.
In order for the system to function adequately, vertical integration is required. Deci-
sions must propagate top-down and information has to propagate bottom-up. The interde-
pendencies across all the hierarchy levels are critical, making safety an emergent property.
The lack of vertical integration, caused in part by a lack of feedback across levels, threat-
ens safety, which implies that the decisions of all the actors, not just the front-line workers
alone, can cause incidents. However, since nobody has a global view of the entire system,
actors at each level cannot see how their decisions interact with those made by actors at
other levels, so the threats to safety are not obvious before an incident occurs, and are
usually caused by multiple contributing factors, not just a single catastrophic decision or
action [8]. Rasmussen also remarks that “in this situation, modelling activity in terms of
task sequences and errors is not very effective for understanding behavior” [67].
The second part of Rasmussen’s framework considers financial pressures pushing the
actors to work fiscally responsibly, and psychological pressures pushing the actors to work
in a more mentally or physically efficient manner. As a result, work practices migrate over
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Figure 2.3: Rasmussen’s risk management framework: the socio-technical system in-
volved in risk management. Source: [67]
time, at multiple levels, toward the boundary of safety, making the systems defences de-
grade and gradually erode. After multiple migrations of work practices at various levels,
and the presence of a triggering event, not just an unusual action or an entirely new, one-
time threat to safety, incidents can occur [67], [8]. While the first part of Rasmussen’s
framework relates to the multiple stakeholders of protective systems, and their many in-
teractions, the second part remarks the importance of MOC, not only in the physical com-
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ponents of the system, affected by wear, technological changes, and financial constraints,
but also in the people, practices, policies and procedures, as well as other intangible parts
of the protective systems that can change over time, affecting its performance.
Rasmussen also developed the Accimap method as a means of graphically representing
factors from different systems levels that have contributed to accidents7. Accimaps show
the interactions between factors both within and across the different systems levels, and
have been applied to the analysis of incidents within many domains [81].
2.3.2 HROs
HROs are those organizations that could have failed resulting in catastrophic conse-
quences, and did not, in the order of tens of thousands of times. They are characterized by
both advanced technology and high degrees of interdependence [70]. Common elements
that HROs use to identify and mitigate risk are: effective process auditing, migrating deci-
sion making, recognition of goal conflicts, alignment of reward and punishment systems,
redundancy of people and/or hardware in a variety of forms (including duplication and
overlap), senior managers who can see the “big picture”, formal rules and procedures, and
lack of exclusive reliance on externally imposed rules and regulations [72]. Strategies to
lessen dysfunctional characteristics in hazardous organizations include: continuous train-
ing, redundancy, responsibility and accountability at all levels in the organization, job
design strategies to keep incompatible functions separate, have many direct information
sources, flexible exercises, job specialization, system flexibility, hierarchical specializa-
tion, and bargaining and negotiation [69].
There are five major building blocks that are necessary for mitigating error, but that
often seem absent in disasters: flexible organizational structuring, attention to reliability
as a rival to efficiency, avoiding core competencies becoming incompetencies, adequate
7See Footnote 25 on page 10.
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sense-making, and group performance and heedful interaction [71]. The incident com-
mand system (ICS) is an organizational approach to emergency or disaster management,
able to attain remarkable reliability under a broad range of working conditions, including
the uncertain and instable ones. Its components are: structuring mechanisms, organiza-
tional support for constrained improvisation, and cognition management methods [4].
2.3.3 Safety function
SysML has been employed successfully in the aerospace industry. Jensen and Tumer
[42] recently used SysML to evaluate the safety of a system under critical event scenar-
ios involving one or more component failures, in the early design stage of a maneuvering
system for a satellite. They stated that when a failure in a system happens, it is the compo-
nents, and not the functions, which behave differently. In their system model, besides the
object view for the software and hardware components, and the view of function for their
behavior, they added another view, defined as “safety functions”, to describe the property
of a system to resist moving from a hazardous state to an accident8 state. When a system
is in a hazardous state, it can only transition into the mishap state if the safety function is
lost or ineffective, thus, they developed a method to represent the safety functions as part
of the design process. Their safety functions are comparable to protective systems in a
broad sense.
2.4 Literature review on specific topics covered in the introduction
2.4.1 Lack of historical data on failure of protective systems, consequences, and
alternative sources
In the introduction we mentioned that the lack of historical data on the failure of pro-
8See Footnote 25 on page 10.
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tective systems complicates analysis. Protective system failure is very infrequent. Near
misses, however, are much more frequent. Models such as the safety pyramid, based on
the work of H. W. Heinrich9, illustrate the typical frequency of occurrence of incidents,
and show a large difference in the ratio of serious incidents and near misses. According to
them, for every fatality, there are about 30 serious injuries, 300 minor injuries, 3,000 near
misses, and at least 300,000 at-risk behaviors. They suggest that the underlying causes of
incidents at each level are essentially the same, and therefore more serious incidents can
be reduced by focusing on the bottom of the pyramid, where more data exists. While it
is a good idea to identify and address the initiating causes of incidents, it must be clear to
the reader that, even in the presence of an initiating cause, if protective systems work as
intended, the critical consequences can be prevented or mitigated. The information pro-
vided by the study of near misses may not always be related to aspects affecting protective
systems, hence, its usefulness is limited.
2.4.2 Civil liability vs. safety regulation
In order to understand the role that regulators and judges play to mitigate moral hazard
and induce preventive and protective measures, as well as identify their limitations in these
matters, in the following paragraphs we will examine related literature pertaining mostly
to environmental damages.
Accident10 law seeks to deter the risk-creators and compensate the victims when an
accident occurs. Safety regulation intervenes ex ante (before an accident occurs), and civil
liability intervenes ex post (after an accident occurs). From an economics perspective, an
optimal level of care for deterrence purposes minimizes the costs of both accident and
accident avoidance, while an optimal rule for compensation purposes transfers the losses
9See [35] for the original work and [68] for the models that derived from or extended it.
10See Footnote 25 on page 10.
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from the victim onto the risk-creator [3]. In a civil liability regime, the social costs of
the accident are shifted to the tortfeasor [77]; therefore, each risk-creator determines his
level of preventive measures based on his costs of care and the probability of being held
liable in case of accident [7]. Regarding environmental damages, theoretically, tort law
may provide optimal care at lower costs than regulation [38], as an ex post liability system
not only provides compensation, but also induces investments in prevention [27], [6] in
order to avoid lawsuits, while regulation needs to be enforced whether there is harm or
not, whenever a standard is breached. Furthermore, in a regulatory regime, the state has to
determine the optimal level of care for each risk-creator [48], which implies that regulators
need to know the costs of care of each polluter and the consequences of each accident to
achieve best practice through regulation [3].
Despite the convenience of its lower cost, civil liability alone is not the preferred tool,
as it has three serious failures in the environmental risk domain [3]: the problem of rational
apathy11, the problem of causal uncertainty12, and the problem of insolvency13. Broadly,
in technological disasters, even when a liable tortfeasor can be identified, the damage
must be directly attributed to causes that are man-made for liability rules to play their
preventive and compensating functions. “The only possibility to apply tort law in case of
natural disasters is to argue that public authorities were at fault e.g. by failing to prevent
the disaster or not taking adequate measures to mitigate the damage” [27]14. Although
catastrophes caused by terrorism are man-made, the terrorist may not always be found or
11Victims may not sue when damages are widespread, as the damages every individual victim suffers are
too small compared to the legal costs of suing, or simply because damages are unknown at the time they
occur, as is the case in carcinogenic emissions. Rational apathy is treated in [59].
12Causal uncertainty refers to the difficulty to establish the causal link between damages and a polluter’s
activity with absolute certainty.
13Polluters may cause damages far higher than their assets. Insolvency occurs in any situation where
the amount of the damage is higher than the tortfeasor’s wealth, which is very likely to happen in case of
catastrophes [27].
14For example, if the government failed to give proper warning in case of a flooding, or provided building
permits on the slopes of an active volcano [27].
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can be insolvent. Finally, in some cases private parties may lack adequate information on
preventive technology, while the government can take advantage of economies of scale to
invest more efficiently in preventive technologies and pass on information to the parties in
the market through regulation [27]. Therefore, regulation is commonly accepted as a more
effective instrument to control externalities15 [78] and prevent environmental accidents
[73], [23]. Economists favor the combination of safety regulation and insurance to cope
with industrial accidents, particularly when environmental damages may occur [3].
Nevertheless, in practice, the deterrent effect of regulation often fails due to financial
and informational constraints [65]. Financial constraints refer to the fact that the limited
budget of regulatory agencies may impede an adequate level of monitoring or supervision
of critical facilities; whereas informational constraints imply that “regulators have to de-
termine the costs of abatement and the costs of care for each polluter, and this information
is privately owned by polluters themselves” [3]. Also, certain aspects of safety are difficult
to observe before an accident occurs, as they would require detailed knowledge of internal
characteristics of every firm. This is the case of organizational negligence as a product of
understaffing, which often leads to excessive working time, an inadequate delegation of
power, or the lack of appropriate skills for certain jobs [3].
While both ex post civil liability and ex ante safety regulation have limitations, it has
been demonstrated that the joint use of liability and regulation is socially beneficial [3],
[27], [6], [75]. The activities of regulators and judges in promoting safer management of
hazardous operations are complementary and interdependent. Judges often rely on prior
regulation when dealing with cases of causal uncertainty, and use breaches of regulation
as evidence of increased risk of an activity by the perpetrator. On the other hand, they do
not accept the compliance with regulatory standards as a defense against liability. How-
ever, if, despite having complied with regulation, an accident still occurs, judges observe
15Such as damage to critical infrastructure.
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the polluter’s careful management and relieve him from civil liability only if he also took
enough precaution in this dimension of care16. Judges can hold regulators liable when
regulators did not monitor a regulated plant. Judges also dispute over the regulation itself
(e.g. with conflicting national and regional regulations, or whenever ancient and new stan-
dards coexist). Furthermore, the problems raised by victims before courts help regulators
identify the need to adapt norms and standards to current issues [3]. In practice, sharing
information and coordinating actions among regulators and between judges and regulators
is complex, among other reasons, due to the variety of local officials and polices with the
same role [3].
Various studies show that the impact of monitoring and enforcement actions of regula-
tors on the environmental performance of polluters has been positive [54], [50], [31], [61],
[20]. However, as mentioned earlier, financial constraints may prevent regulatory agencies
from performing these actions efficiently. When the measurement of emissions is very
costly, regulators may attempt to infer a firm’s compliance status based on the inspection
of production and abatement equipment, the review of its production and environmen-
tal records, and interviews with its employees [55]. Conversely, when measuring emission
levels is feasible, one way to complement or supplement traditional enforcement actions is
the adoption of structured information programs (or public disclosure programs) to reveal
the environmental performance of polluters [29]. It has been shown that public disclosure
helps to induce emission reduction [46]17, with a relatively stronger impact than that of
fines [29], and that the judgments of environmental performance that customers, suppliers
and stockholders do affect the expected costs and revenues of some firms [18]. One of the
reasons to support information disclosure as an enforcement tool is that stock markets re-
16In [75] the author proposes to sufficiently reward the injurer whenever an accident happens and socially
optimal precaution has been taken.
17In [46] the authors found that firms with the largest stock price decline on the day their toxic release
inventory (TRI) emissions information became public subsequently reduced emissions more than their in-
dustry peers.
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act significantly to the release of information regarding the superior or poor environmental
performance of plants [33], [46], [49]. This, in turn, is an incentive for the shareholders
of the firms to demand management to invest in protective systems to prevent major re-
leases of pollutants (or more broadly, any safety-critical incident), when companies are
publicly-traded (which may not always be the case).
Besides shareholders, insurers, and other type of financers, e.g. secured lenders, may
also induce the firms to adopt adequate prevention measures. This is because in some
countries and under certain circumstances18, in order to mitigate the insolvency problem,
courts may “extend liability for residual damages to parties that have contractual relation-
ships with the firm that causes the damages” [6]. Conditioning financing or insurance to
the adoption or continuing use of existing protective systems, or transferring the expected
liability costs financers would face to firms’ financing conditions, may be strong incen-
tives for companies to adopt best practices and invest in protective equipment. Even in the
event an accident occurred and protective systems failed, this measure would be beneficial
to the victims, who otherwise would not receive compensation and end up paying the costs
if the tortfeasors were insolvent. In that case, the remaining costs would be shifted from
the victims to the financers. Although the insolvent company or companies in which the
incident originated19 would still not cover all the damages, it can be argued that moral
hazard would be reduced, as financers do profit from the operation of the company in
more favorable circumstances, or have already recovered the costs through the premiums
and interests charged. However, in reality, insurers and “financers have only incomplete
18For example, when the involvement of secured lenders in the firm, before and/or after the accident
and/or the foreclosure, exceed the level warranted to secure their interest [6].
19These may include, in some cases, the designers or the manufacturers of the equipment that failed.
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information about the preventive measures adopted by the firms they finance” [6]20.
The neighboring community is another agent who may interact with companies di-
rectly, but in most cases does it through either regulators, or non-governmental organiza-
tions, to demand information, law enforcement, and safety and environmental measures,
which could be translated into the use of protective systems.
Communities which are richer, better educated, and more organized find many
ways of enforcing environmental norms. Where formal regulators are present,
communities use the political process to influence the tightness of enforce-
ment. Where formal regulators are absent or ineffective, ‘informal regulation’
may be implemented through community groups or NGOs (non-governmental
organizations) [29].
Considering the effect that releasing information to the public can have in the behavior
of the firms, as well as the existence of multiple agents able to induce various forms of
safety and environmental practices in companies, and who need information in the process,
it becomes clear that regulators can take advantage of informational approaches to enforce
the law.
Once we introduce a world of multiple agents (and consequently multiple in-
centives), there may be a need to rethink the regulator’s appropriate role in
pollution management. It may be that this role is no longer confined to de-
signing, monitoring, and enforcing rules and standards. Instead, the regulator
can gain leverage through non-traditional programs which harness the power
of communities and markets. In this context, there may be ample room for
20Recall that the problem of asymmetry of information previously identified enables moral hazard. In the
end, the intention of this work is not merely to make those who profit under favorable circumstances, or the
responsible of causing a catastrophe pay the costs and compensate the victims, but to prevent catastrophes
from occurring. Legal actions that enforce the adoption and use of protective systems are therefore of
interest. We believe that, in order to design, manage, and regulate effective protective systems, asymmetry
of information and moral hazard need to be addressed.
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information-oriented approaches such as the public disclosure of plants’ envi-
ronmental performance [29].
In fact, the role of regulators is not limited to establishing, controlling, inspecting
and enforcing regulation. Governments and regulators act as information clearinghouses
who acquire information, synthesize it, and make it available to people who are making
social choice decisions. By performing such activities, they contribute to decrease the
asymmetry of information related to moral hazard. Some countries may have more or less
communicative regulatory bodies than others; however, communication with the public is
an essential duty of the regulatory authority, particularly in the context of safety21.
21In the U.S. nuclear sector, for example, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), whose respon-
sibilities include “providing independent, neutral, balanced and factual information about any issue related
to nuclear safety in the country” [39], remarks the importance of having regular routine communications
with its audiences, in addition to communicating in response to incidents; being notified of unusual events
by their licensees and provide them with feedback on recent safety developments and inspections completed;
communicate with decision makers, coordinating communication activities to provide coherent information
when regulatory responsibilities for nuclear safety are divided among different organizations; communicat-
ing with regulatory counterparts in other countries; working with professional organizations, universities,
NGOs, etc., to exchange information, increase awareness of their respective works, get acquainted with new
developments, and understand and address their concerns. With regard to communication, its counterpart in
Finland, the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) is responsible for writing, publishing and dis-
tributing educational material and background information, organizing meetings with journalists and other
interested groups, providing timely information on events related to nuclear safety, and responding to the
questions of political decision makers, other government authorities, journalists, or members of the general
public [39].
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3. CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF PROTECTIVE SYSTEMS
This section presents our conceptual model of protective systems, depicted in Figure
3.1, and describes its elements, interactions, and dynamic nature.
Figure 3.1: Conceptual model of protective systems.
Our conceptual model graphically represents the various broad, interrelated elements,
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that together constitute a protective system. We identify the respective parts or instances
of each element, in order to provide a baseline to derive the structure our system model
(developed in section 4). Then, we discuss some of the interactions among these elements,
as well as their dynamic nature. This stresses the importance of understanding them while
managing protective systems, and serves to recognize further structural aspects, as well as
some of the behaviors and requirements that our system model should encompass.
3.1 Elements for the structural decomposition
3.1.1 Physical components
We begin with the physical components (A), such as those in the preventive, mitiga-
tive, barriers, and limitation layers of protection. Examples of these components include
sensors, alarms, pressure relief devices, dikes, water curtains, and emergency shutdown
systems.
3.1.2 Management system
The physical components are supported by a management system (B), which com-
prises the structure, processes and resources included in the inherently safer design, con-
trol and supervisory layers1, as well as the management part behind the response layer.
The management system is an essential part of any protective system. It includes the op-
erating procedures, control systems, monitoring and supervision activities during regular
operations to prevent hazardous events and correct anomalies.
The management system encompasses several activities of major importance: de-
sign procedures, management of change, documentation, hazard assessment, processes
intended to review and preserve equipment integrity, human factors, training, audits, inci-
1Recall the protection layers in Figure 2.2.
43
dent investigation, and emergency response, among others. A detailed list of the process
safety management elements related to management systems can be based on standards
and models such as those presented in section 2.2.2.
3.1.3 Policy, laws and regulation
The management system involves the structure, processes and resources needed to
establish the operating policy (C) of the protective system. This policy must comply with
the applicable laws and regulation (D).
3.1.4 Stakeholders
The conceptual model also captures the existence and role of the stakeholders (E).
They can be classified into three broad groups: the internal ones, who belong to the com-
pany and are actively involved in the design, operation and management activities (e.g.
management, workers); the external ones who do not belong to the company but are also
involved in such activities (e.g. manufacturers, first responders, regulatory authorities);
and the external who are not actively involved but can be affected when the protective
system fails (e.g. near neighbors).
3.1.5 Lifecycle
The lifecycle (F) suggests that there are various stages that depend on and build upon
each other over time. The artifacts of our system model should illustrate that certain ac-
tivities occur only during specific stages. They should also show that the outputs of each
stage may become the inputs for the subsequent, inheriting further characteristics, con-
sequences of decisions or issues to address. While decommission and obsolescence may
happen, this model focuses on evolution and continuous improvement, consistent with a
“cradle-to-cradle” philosophy.
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3.2 Interactions and dynamics: requirements and further structural and behav-
ioral features to capture in our system model
Our conceptual model presents a brief structural decomposition of the main types of
elements of a protective system. Indeed, protective systems are more than their physi-
cal components, which are designed, developed, installed, operated, maintained, and im-
proved, until they are decommissioned due to their obsolescence, and replaced by better
technology. By definition, the protection layers are supported by a management system,
in which various stakeholders who own and operate, or are affected by them, define and
execute the internal operating policy, or the laws and regulations that must be complied,
and all these activities occur in various stages of the system lifecycle. However, although
all these broad elements are necessary for the system to function, the interactions within
and among these elements, as well as their dynamic nature, are of major importance. As
such, they need to be understood and included in our system model.
3.2.1 The importance of understanding the interactions among elements
Clearly, physical components interact among themselves. Final elements will only
work when logic solvers determine that based on the inputs provided through the sen-
sors; closing a valve on the discharge of a pump may result in pump damage; or opening
a pressure control vent valve could affect the amount of released gases that flares or in-
cinerators will need to burn. In a similar fashion, there exist several interactions among
the elements of a management system. Lessons to learn revealed in audits and incident
investigations, as well as new operating procedures, have to be communicated to the ap-
propriate personnel and contractors in the form of training; hazard analysis or evaluation
need process safety information, and changes in any element have to be assessed and ap-
proved by management of change. For the sake of simplicity, this conceptual model does
not show all possible interactions among elements of the same type; however, it illustrates
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some important interactions and dependencies.
The arrows that connect each lifecycle stage represent how stages depend on and build
upon each other. Other artifacts of the systems model should show what stakeholders
participate in each stage. The needs of the three groups of stakeholders are refined into
requirements for the physical components and the management system that supports them.
Internal stakeholders can determine the policy, while some external stakeholders can affect
the applicable laws and regulation. Stakeholders, therefore, can affect the physical com-
ponents, the management system, the policy, and the laws and regulation that comprise the
protective system, but they are also affected when the protective system fails. Thus, our
model connects these elements with bidirectional arrows.
Stakeholders also interact among themselves and may affect each other. The internal
stakeholders, as well as the external involved, own the protective system and work together
to design and operate it; therefore, they possess more information about it, compared to the
remaining external stakeholders. However, the interests of these external affected stake-
holders can be taken into account by some of the external stakeholders who are involved,
including the regulatory authorities and some citizen participation groups who represent
the near neighbors. As these two sets of external stakeholders interact, the issues that arise
with asymmetry of information can be prevented or mitigated.
The management system (B), which is supporting the physical components (A) in
our conceptual model, involves the structure, processes and resources needed to establish
the operating policy of the protective system. The arrow that connects the management
system and the policy is intended to illustrate this unidirectional dependency. The policy
must comply with the applicable laws and regulation (D). The model does not include
an arrow that connects the policy with laws and regulations because the policy does not
automatically change when the regulation does. However, laws and regulation can affect
the internal stakeholders who are able to change it directly, and the stakeholders who
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create or modify the laws and regulations can affect the management system that helps to
establish the operating policy. Graphically representing the management system (B), the
policy (C), and the laws and regulation (D) as various layers with laws and regulation as
the outer layer reinforces the idea of compliance.
3.2.2 The importance of understanding their dynamic nature
The elements of protective systems interact among themselves. These interactions
need to be understood, as no individual has full visibility of the whole complex system,
and yet, changes in one element can affect others as well. Nevertheless, changes are con-
stant; protective systems have a dynamic nature. The safety-critical technologies they are
intended to protect evolve over time, and protective systems must respond to the new de-
mands as well. Their physical components become obsolete as they wear out and technol-
ogy advances; personnel turnover stresses the importance of documentation and training,
laws and regulations are amended, the needs and requirements of each type of stakeholders
change, and the operating policy suffers modifications as the management system adjusts
accordingly. Change is inevitable and needs to be managed effectively, otherwise the effi-
cacy of protective systems can be compromised. For that reason, MOC is essential.
We have identified the elements of protective systems and some of their essential fea-
tures, and have remarked the importance of understanding their interactions and their dy-
namic nature. The concepts analyzed have provided us with an idea of the structure and
behaviors to include in a system model, created according to the tenors of MBSE, which
will be presented in the next section.
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4. RESULTS
In this section we develop a new model1 of protective systems, and demonstrate some
of the capabilities and benefits of using the MBSE approach to address their challenges.
The complete diagrams mentioned in this section can be found as appendices, in the sepa-
rate file Diagrams.pdf.
4.1 SysML model
4.1.1 SysML model of protective systems
In the previous section we described a conceptual model of protective systems, which
included the physical components, the management system that supports them and helps
to determine the operating policy, consistent with the applicable laws and regulations, in
which various stakeholders participated throughout its various lifecycle stages. Based on
that broad representation, we have crafted a model in SysML that allows us to present
in detail each one of those elements, including their structure, their behaviors, and more
importantly, the relations and interactions among them.
This model has over 500 blocks, 74 activities, 49 packages, 31 requirements, 77 use
cases, and 7 views and viewpoints, depicted in over 65 diagrams, which were created with
information extracted and adapted from texts such as the CCPS guidelines [13], [10], [14],
and OSHA PSM [82].
4.1.1.1 LOPA as simply one of many views
The reader must be aware that the diagrams in SysML are views of the systems model,
1We used the modeling language SysML, and the software NoMagic MagicDraw 18.3 with its SysML
Plugin.
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which reveal portions of the model at specific levels of granularity. Under this logic,
the current characterization of protective systems as a group of protection layers used in
LOPA, commonly utilized in the industry, can be included in our model as one of its
many views. Later, we enhance this characterization by integrating the elements from our
conceptual model. A detailed view of the protection layers serves as a starting point to
capture the physical components. Figure 4.1 depicts the types of protection layers and
initiating causes.
Figure 4.1: Protection layers and initiating causes.
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Diagram 1 shows a taxonomy2 of the protection layers. It displays the generalization3
between some devices and the type of protection layer into which they can be classified.
Complementing this diagram, Diagram 2 has a taxonomy of initiating causes. A more
detailed view of the protection layers in Diagram 3 contains not only generalizations but
also composite associations4, reference associations5, and dependencies6.
Figure 4.2: Portion of BDD in Diagram 3 depicting process alarms.
A portion of Diagram 3 is shown in Figure 4.2. It illustrates that process alarms belong
to the Control protection layer, that they have hardware and software, and that changes to
alarms hardware may affect alarms software. Another portion, shown in Figure 4.3, in-
cludes pressure relief devices, knockout drums, condensers, incinerators, scrubbers, vents
and two kinds of flares (ground and elevated). It exposes the unidirectional connections
2The type of diagram used here to convey system decomposition and type classification is a block defi-
nition diagram (BDD).
3The notation for a generalization is a solid line with a hollow, triangular arrowhead on the end of the
supertype [22]. It shows that the subtype is a type of a supertype.
4A composite association between two blocks conveys structural decomposition. An instance of the block
at the composite end is made up some number of instances of the block at the part end. The notation for a
composite association on a BDD is a solid line between two blocks with a solid diamond on the composite
end [22]. A composition denotes a class as an aggregate and describes a whole-part hierarchy. The aggregate
is existentially responsible for its parts [89].
5A reference association between two blocks means that a connection can exist between instances of
those blocks in an operational system, and those instances can access each other for some purpose across
the connection. A solid line between two blocks with an open arrowhead on one end conveys unidirectional
access, and the absence of arrowheads on either end conveys bidirectional access [22].
6A dependency conveys that when the supplier element changes, the client element may also have to
change. The notation is a dashed line with an open arrowhead, which is drawn from the client to the supplier
[22].
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that exist among pressure relief devices with knockout drums, condensers and incinera-
tors; pressure relief devices and vents; scrubbers and vents; and scrubbers and flares. It
also shows that the necessary height of the elevated flares depends on the flare stack di-
ameter, the distance from the flare base, the desired heat intensity, the vapor rate, and
the molecular weight of the vapor. Diagram 4 reveals the functions that these types of
mechanical equipment perform in a relief system.
Figure 4.3: Portion of BDD in Diagram 3 depicting relations among various types of
mechanical equipment.
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Figure 4.4: Selected physical components with properties assigned at various levels.
4.1.1.2 Physical components
Another view of the taxonomy of protection layers establishes, through generaliza-
tions, that most of the elements that constitute the protection layers are in fact physical
components. This allows us to include the physical components from our conceptual
model in our systems model, but it also gives us the possibility to assign structural and
behavioral features to the block of physical components, which will be inherited automat-
ically, by transitivity, to all the subtypes, and then assign further properties only to specific
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subtypes.
This way, it is easy to state, as illustrated in Figure 4.4, that all physical components
have maintenance procedures, installation procedures, and inspection and testing proce-
dures; but only certain physical components have further properties, such as the mechan-
ical equipment, which also has piping and instrument diagrams; while the various types
of pressure relief devices, which are a subset of the mechanical equipment, have a relief
system design and design basis as well. Diagram 5 presents the view of all the physical
components of our model.
Figure 4.5: Block of the management system.
4.1.1.3 Management system
Themanagement system is represented in our system model through several BDDs that
display its various elements, including those present in OSHA PSM and some others from
the models described in section 2.2.3, and their respective components, modeled as parts.
The BDD in Diagram 6 shows them succinctly, and Diagrams 7 through 20 present the
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BDDs of each individual element with their respective parts. Figure 4.5 exhibits the block
that corresponds to the management system, with its elements displayed as part properties.
Figure 4.6: Portion of the IBD in Diagram 21 depicting information flow within the man-
agement system.
The internal block diagram (IBD) in Diagram 21 reveals the information and objects
that flow across the parts (elements) of the management system, and therefore, possible
interactions among themselves. It emphasizes the relevance of MOC, as several other parts
of the management system interact with it. A portion of it is shown in Figure 4.6.
Figure 4.7: Package of inputs to MOC from process safety information.
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The inputs and outputs to and fromMOC are contained in various packages7 displayed
in Diagram 22. Figure 4.7 shows one of them. A similar diagram also reveals dependencies
among the inputs and outputs, and the areas of the management system that could affect
or be affected if they were modified.
4.1.1.4 MOC system
Given the importance of MOC, besides treating it only as a part of the management sys-
tem, our model includes a section related to MOC systems, based on the CCPS guidelines
in [14]. The commitment that is required from the management stakeholders to MOC
involves the allocation of resources, the inclusion of MOC in the management system,
and providing training to those who are involved in activities derived from or affected by
changes. This is illustrated in Diagram 23. The key principles and essential features of
MOC are shown as use cases in Diagram 24. The activity diagram in Diagram 25 allocates
specific activities associated to them. These activities are not connected to each other by
control or object flows because none of them are mandatory and in some cases can be
executed concurrently. Prior to the formal execution of MOC, there are various tasks that
should be performed during the design and development lifecycle stages to create a MOC
system. They are stated in Diagram 26, which can also be used for comparison purposes,
as these tasks are interrelated. The parts of the design specification are illustrated in Di-
agram 27, and then Diagram 28 depicts what it is implied in the development of a MOC
system.
Diagram 29 analyzes the diverse roles in a team for purposes, summarizes the major
functions of each role8, and illustrates what internal stakeholders should play them. A very
small portion diagram 29 is shown in Figure 4.8. It displays the block that corresponds
7The notation for a package is a folder symbol, that is, a rectangle with a tab on the upper-left side [22].
8Such roles are presented as use cases in Diagram 29.
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Figure 4.8: Portion of the BDD in Diagram 29.
Figure 4.9: Portion of the SEQ in Diagram 31.
to the role of request for change (RFC) authorizers. The properties of this block state
four possible courses of action that they are responsible for: require amendment to the
change request or the implementation process, require that a more rigorous hazard evalua-
tion be conducted, deny the change request, or approve the change for implementation as
requested, accepting any associated risk. It also shows that personnel from management,
staff, work, or contractors, may assume this role. Diagram 31 is a sequence diagram that
shows the steps followed during management of change, as well as the interactions among
the people playing each role. Figure 4.9 shows a portion of it. The activity diagram in
Diagram 32 depicts the RFC review and approval procedure. A portion of it is shown in
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Figure 4.10.
Figure 4.10: Portion of the ACT in Diagram 32.
4.1.1.5 Policy, laws and regulation
In this model, there are various ways to include the policy element from our concep-
tual model. One of them is through the above mentioned information that flows across the
management system parts, as it includes procedures (e.g. maintenance procedures, inspec-
tion procedures) and criteria (e.g. risk tolerance criteria, criteria for applying procedures).
Also, the operating procedures part from the management system itself9 encompasses sev-
9See Diagram 16.
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eral aspects of policy, from the steps required to correct or avoid deviation in the operating
limits or the engineering controls and administrative controls in safer work practices, to
the failure responses, compensating measures and procedures to apply when a shutdown
fails, among others. Some blocks from the taxonomy of the protection layers in Diagram
1 are elements of policy as well. Another way to represent policy consists of the use of
requirements10. Requirements can be written and organized in tables as in Diagram 33,
depicted as part of block diagrams, or as requirement diagrams. Finally, another way to
include the policy in the system model consists of the use of use cases and activity dia-
grams, to illustrate various courses of action11. Figure 4.11 exemplifies how to include
policy in the diagrams using requirements and use cases. Diagram 34 shows one way to
group various elements of policy.
Figure 4.11: Policy depicted with a requirement and a use case.
10The notation for a requirement is a rectangle with the stereotype “requirement” preceding the name.
Requirements have an id and a user defined text of type string. The relationships that can be created among
the requirements and other model elements are: containment, trace, derive requirement, refine, satisfy, and
verify [22].
11We will talk about use cases and activity diagrams later in this section.
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The laws and regulation element from our conceptual model may be represented in
blocks. It can be included in our systems model in the form of requirements as well,
as shown in Diagrams 35 and 36, and indirectly, through the government and regulators,
which are modeled as stakeholders. Also, we used requirements to model the core at-
tributes of the protection layers in Diagram 37.
4.1.1.6 Lifecycle
Our system model presents various views regarding the lifecycle. The simplest one
is in the form of a BDD, shown in Diagram 38 and Figure 4.12, which declares that the
lifecycle is an aggregate12 of various stages. The direct reference associations that link
them convey the idea that they depend on and build upon each other13.
SysML allows us to model the structure, but also the behavior of the system. The ac-
tivity diagram shown in Diagram 39 illustrates the major broad activities that are supposed
to occur during the different stages of the system lifecycle. Although our model does not
encompass them, it is possible to create further diagrams that explain in greater detail each
one of the activities shown, including other behaviors such as state machines or additional
activities that can be invoked if enabled. The lifecycle stages appear as partitions in the
form of swimlanes, and each activity is allocated to the stage in which it should be per-
formed. The necessary inputs and outputs of each activity are depicted, as well as the flow
of object tokens (in this case, information) and control tokens that enable the subsequent
activities. A small portion of the activity diagram in Diagram 39 is shown in Figure 4.13. It
depicts the activity “Develop instrumented protective system design basis that implements
12Aggregation describes a class as an aggregate and specifies a whole-part relationship between the ag-
gregate (whole) and a component part. In contrast to a composition, the aggregate is not responsible for its
parts [89]. The notation for aggregation is a solid line between two blocks with a hollow diamond on the
aggregate end. A direct aggregation will have an open arrowhead on the part end.
13Although the position of the arrowheads in the direct reference associations between lifecycle stages
might seem counterintuitive, the arrowheads do not stand for the chronological flow of information. Instead,
their position suggest that later stages can access (information from) earlier stages.
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Figure 4.12: Lifecycle.
the risk reduction strategy” (the activity “Develop risk reduction strategy”, not shown in
the figure, precedes it), which is allocated to the design phase.
As opposed to the case of a simple drawing, in this model the inputs and outputs of
the major activities performed during the lifecycle of a protective system are not just texts;
instead, they are referenced to objects in the form of blocks that reside in a specific repos-
itory within the model and may appear in other diagrams. Therefore, they have properties
(including parts and references) and further capabilities that are of interest for analysis,
as well as in the management of protective systems and the management of change. For
example, the first output of the activity depicted in Figure 4.13, corresponds to the block
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Figure 4.13: Portion of Diagram 39 depicting an activity within the design stage.
shown in Figure 4.14. The reference properties it contains summarize other blocks it ag-
gregates, which in turn have more direct aggregations.
Figure 4.14: Block of the instrumented protective function design basis
Some elements are inputs to more than one activity throughout the lifecycle stages,
others are outputs from one activity and inputs to another. These repetitions may be diffi-
cult to identify in this activity diagram. However, other diagrams reveal them with more
clarity, and also include the structural decomposition of these elements. The BDD in Dia-
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gram 40 shows the structure of the elements, organized according to the lifecycle stages to
which they are allocated, i.e., where they are used (placing emphasis on which elements
are used during each lifecycle stage), and color coded to specify whether the block corre-
sponds to a lifecycle phase, an input, an output, an input and output, or a requirement. A
portion of its miniature can be found in Figure 4.15.
Figure 4.15: Miniature of a portion of Diagram 40 showing that the blocks of some inputs
and outputs are allocated to more than one lifecycle stage (blue).
Diagram 41, whose miniature is shown in Figure 4.16, presents the same content,
but rearranged as a tulip (placing emphasis on the elements and in which stages they are
used). The blocks at the core are used in various lifecycle stages, while those in the pe-
riphery are used during one stage only. Therefore, the elements at the core may have a
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Figure 4.16: Miniature of Diagram 41 with inputs and outputs arranged as a tulip.
greater importance and complexity in the whole system. These are14: hazardous events
descriptions (4), independent protection layers (2 plus a dependency), instrumented pro-
tective function design basis (2), operability requirements (3), process safety information
(4), reliability requirements (3), internal technical practices (3), functionality requirements
(3), maintainability requirements (3), independent protection layers analysis report (2 plus
a dependency), equipment list (4), and detailed engineering specification (2).
14The number between parentheses next to them corresponds to the number of allocations to lifecycle
stages that they have.
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4.1.1.7 Stakeholders
There are various diagrams in our model that include the stakeholders. The BDD in
Diagram 42 presents a basic classification of the three main groups of stakeholders con-
sidered in the conceptual model, and broad categories of representative people or groups
within them. Although the software tool we used allowed us to show them as icons, they
still are blocks, and can have the properties and functionalities that blocks do. A portion of
this diagram is displayed in Figure 4.17. Diagram 43 shows a more detailed taxonomy of
stakeholders, which encompasses stakeholders considered in various mismatching CCPS
guidelines, but also in Rasmussen’s framework, and those explicitly mentioned in OSHA
PSM. The use of generalizations in the diagram allow the subtypes to inherit the properties
assigned to their supertype.
Although every stakeholder contributes to or is affected by the protective system ef-
ficacy at some point, not all the stakeholders participate in each lifecycle stage. Further-
more, the roles and concerns of those who participate in more than one stage vary accord-
ingly. Diagram 44 summarizes the stakeholders that actively participate in each lifecycle
phase and their respective concerns15.
Similar to Figure 4.18, Diagrams 45a and 45b contain the views16 and viewpoints17
with the various concerns of those stakeholders during the stages in which they participate.
Furthermore, they include packages that contain all the elements of the model allocated or
somehow associated to such lifecycle phases, detailed in Diagrams 46 through 52. This
allows to compartmentalize the model and grant that the stakeholders have access to only
15Based on [13].
16A view is a package that selectively imports other packages, elements, and diagrams in the systemmodel
that together represent an aspect of the model that is of interest to a particular set of stakeholders [22].
17A viewpoint is a model element that contains the stakeholders (those that would find this viewpoint rel-
evant to their concerns), the concerns (a string that expresses the stakeholder questions that will be answered
by the elements and diagrams contained within a conforming view), the purpose (a string that specifies the
reason why the viewpoint was defined), the languages (a list of the modeling languages used in a conforming
view) and the methods (the set of rules followed to construct a conforming view).
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Figure 4.17: Stakeholders.
the model elements that are relevant to them, or to those they are authorized to see. While
this makes sense in terms of security and specialization, the limited visibility of the stake-
holders and the impact their actions and decisions could have in other parts of the system
by this practice stresses the need to have tools to overcome it.
4.2 Analyses yielded by MBSE
MBSE allows us to employ various software tools that work with SysML, and provide
managers (or other users) with tools for impact analysis and management of change.
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Figure 4.18: Views and viewpoints of two stakeholders importing packages.
4.2.1 Identify where a model element is used
Suppose we wanted to make a change in one of our model elements. In order to
determine whether that would impact other parts of the system or not, we would need to
know where else in the model that element is used. The software tool we have chosen
to create our model of protective systems has the capability to quickly identify in which
diagrams that object appears, open them, and show its location, or navigate through them.
4.2.2 Identify the relations among elements
Knowing the usage of an element in other diagrams is convenient, but it is not enough
66
to view that element in isolation. As we have previously suggested, there exist several
kinds of relations among the model elements. Therefore, we need to identify the other
model elements that interact with it, as well as the types of relations it has with them. We
can quickly display in the current diagram the related elements from other diagrams18, or
display a list with the elements of the model that use it or depend on it.
Alternatively, we can generate a dependency report19, which will list all the model
elements that have any kind of declared relation with the element, as well as the type of
relation, such as containment, dependency, allocation, association or direct association,
aggregation or direct aggregation, composition or direct composition, generalization, ap-
plied stereotypes (including imports of packages) or if it is a connector though which
information is conveyed from one node to another. Nevertheless, the dependency report
has some limitations: it does not show the direction of the arrows in the relations (i.e.
it does not specify whether the related element is a client or a supplier), and it does not
display inherited relationships (i.e., those assigned to a supertype). Both can be overcome
by opening the specification of block properties directly in the software for the desired
blocks.
Another option we have is to generate a dependency matrix20, or an allocation matrix21,
which will display all the elements in the model in the first row and column vectors and
the existing relations among them in the appropriate entries22. Of course, in models with
several unrelated elements these matrices are very sparse. A portion of an allocation matrix
is shown in Figure 4.19. Either the dependency report or the dependency matrix can be
used to identify further possible impacts. If the model only declares a dependency between
18The software will modify a diagram in which the element appears, by displaying its related elements
and the type of relation they have.
19In Microsoft Word.
20In Microsoft Excel.
21In MagicDraw
22These matrices have the same limitations a dependency report has. Thus, using the specification of
block properties in conjunction with the matrices is recommended.
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elements A and B, and between elements B and C, the user of these reports may be able to
infer that element C could be indirectly affected by element A; thus having the big picture
that dependency matrices provide could be beneficial.
Figure 4.19: Portion of an allocation matrix.
Needless to say, these capabilities are limited or of very little use when the relations
between elements are not modeled. However, in a well constructed model, they can be
very useful for impact analysis and management of change.
4.2.3 Impact analysis, in the context of management of change, requires a model
and a method
One of the key principles and essential features of management of change is to evaluate
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possible impacts23. The outputs of our model, and our model itself, offer the stakeholders
tools to perform this activity, as impact analysis requires a model and a method.
We have presented a detailed model24 of protective systems that includes several inter-
related elements displayed in its various views. Its outputs include lists and matrices that
show the dependencies and other relations among its elements, and the software functions
allow the user to quickly identify where each elements is used. Therefore, our proposed
method for impact analysis recommends to first use the tools to identify where an element
of the model is used, in order to ensure that a possible change to it that seems pertinent
according to a diagram, is indeed suitable in the remaining diagrams. Second, the user
should refer to the outputs of the model and check what are the other elements that have
any dependencies or other declared relations with the element whose impact is being an-
alyzed, and what kind of relations exist among them. If there are dependencies25 with
other elements, the user should go further and identify the dependencies that those related
elements have with other not already considered elements.
4.2.4 Simulation
Our model also offers quantitative capabilities, and is suitable for simulation and other
subordinate analyses, including trade studies and LOPA. We modeled various equations
used in LOPA26 in constraint blocks, and defined value properties27 in some blocks that
23According to the CCPS, the key principles and essential features of management of change are: (1)
Maintain a dependable management of change practice, (2) Identify potential change situations, (3) Evaluate
possible impacts, (4) Decide whether to allow the change, and (5) Complete follow-up activities [14].
24This model can be extended and adapted to the characteristics of the industry in which will be used.
25Dependencies communicate that a change in the supplier element (at the arrowhead end) may result in
a change to the client element(at the tail end). Therefore, the user must pay attention to the direction of the
dependency to determine whether the element is a client or a supplier.
26The equations are variations (according to its various steps) of the equation used to compute the miti-
gated consequence frequency for a specific consequence, for an initiating event. See Section 2.2 for more
detail.
27Including the probability of failure on demand, the number of similar layers, and the frequency of the
initiating event.
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refer to two particular types of layers of protection and an initiating event (See Diagram
53 or Figure 4.20).
Figure 4.20: LOPA structure for simulation.
Then, we sketched various parametric diagrams to display the bindings between the
variables in the equations and the value properties of such blocks (See Diagram 54 or
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Figure 4.21).
Figure 4.21: Parametric diagram of LOPA for simulation.
After that, we created instances for the blocks, as those in Diagram 55 or Figure 4.22,
where the user can input values either manually, or importing them from a Microsoft
Excel spreadsheet. The software uses an interface28 to use either MathWorks MATLAB or
Wolfram Mathematica as the core solver where the computations are performed, and then
returns the target value(s). It allows the user to update the input and target values in the
28The ParaMagic Plugin developed by InterCAX LLC.
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SysML diagram where the instances are depicted, as well as in the spreadsheet, if desired,
provided that the necessary setup has been done.
Figure 4.22: Instances of LOPA for simulation.
Although there exist certain limitations, the constraint blocks can also include user-
defined functions and scripts to be run in MATLAB or Mathematica during the simulation,
which creates the possibility for both deterministic and stochastic approaches. Also, by
being able to import from Excel the values to populate the instances, the users may also
take advantage of other software tools that work in combination with Excel, such as Pal-
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isade’s @risk. Trade studies, on the other hand, are only supported with Mathematica as
core solver, and one or more Excel spreadsheets with the input variables for the desired
number of scenarios to evaluate.
4.2.5 Animation to find deadlocks in activity diagrams
MBSE offers tools to improve processes that can affect the efficacy of protective sys-
tems. The UML/SysML activity diagrams depict the flow of objects through activities and
nodes, and control tokens that enable actions29. They express the order in which actions
are performed, and (optionally) which structure performs each action.
Although their shapes are different, the elements in activity diagrams have the equiv-
alent functions of the places, transitions, arcs, and tokens of Petri nets30. A Petri net is a
mathematical modeling language that can be used to describe concurrent, stepwise pro-
cesses in discrete systems. Petri nets are used in safety instrumented systems reliability
analysis and testing strategies, as described in [52], but they can also be used to model
several other processes in the context of emergency response and safety in general. A
deadlock is a set of places such that every transition which outputs to one of the places
in the deadlock also inputs from one of these places [88]. The detection of deadlocks
in a process during its design is very important, as they could make it stop and prevent
it to function as intended. Finding deadlocks informally31 in a diagram can be difficult
29Actions start when the activity that owns the action is currently executed, a control token arrives on each
of the incoming control flows, and a sufficient number of object tokens arrive on each of the incoming object
flows to satisfy the lower multiplicity of the respective input pin [22].
30In [26] the authors conclude that the main difference between the Petri net semantics and the semantics
of UML activity diagrams is that Petri net semantics models resource usage of closed, active systems that
are non-reactive, whereas the semantics of UML activity diagrams models open, reactive systems. If a Petri
net is used to model a reactive system, the reactivity of that system is abstracted away from. Given that
reactivity is considered one of the most important aspects of workflow modelling, activity diagrams may
constitute an even better alternative in some cases. Reactivity can be simulated to some extent in Petri nets
by modelling the environment in the Petri net as well.
31There exist various formal methods that require solving logical equations or solving systems of linear
equations or inequalities in order to detect deadlocks.
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and time consuming, however, the animation capabilities in the activity diagrams of our
computerized model allow us to find them more easily than in a static Petri net or activity
diagram.
4.3 How some practices from high reliability organizations are or can be embedded
in the model
SysML allows to embed in our protective systems model some practices from HROs.
The use of redundancy32 can be forced by modeling the element that we want to be re-
dundant, whether it represents hardware or people, as a part of another block33, or using
composite associations to convey structural decomposition34, and establishing in the part
properties or the parts end a multiplicity of 2 or more instances of an item, instead of the
default multiplicity of 1, or the unconstrained number of instances when the multiplicity
is set as 0..* or *.
Figure 4.23: Parts of the asset integrity block where the notation for the multiplicity is
visible.
32Which is often necessary in order to have independence in protection layers.
33As the part properties of the Asset integrity block in the Management System BDD in Diagram 6 or
Figure 4.23.
34As those in Diagram 7 or Figure 4.24.
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Figure 4.24: Composite associations of the asset integrity block
Formal rules can be modeled as requirements, as long as they include the satisfy and
the verify relationships, to allocate such requirements to a structure, and a test case, which
is a behavior created for the purpose of invoking a particular structure’s functionality to
verify that it satisfies the requirements allocated to it. Procedures can and should be mod-
eled using behavioral diagrams, such as the activity, sequence, and state machine dia-
grams. Training and audits must be included in the management system. Hierarchical
specialization may be modeled in BDD with the use of generalizations, focusing on the
characteristics of the subtypes. Of course, simply including these features in our model
does not automatically make protective systems highly reliable, but it helps to establish
characteristics that the protective systems should or must have to maintain or increase
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their reliability.
4.4 Implications of having cross-sections, views and viewpoints, in the context of
shared governance and multiple stakeholders
Many of the model elements evolve around the lifecycle stages. The activities per-
formed, their inputs and outputs, the stakeholders who participate in each one of them
and even their respective interests and responsibilities vary across the stages. For that
reason, it is useful to have packages or subsets of the model that contain specifically the
model elements that are applicable during each stage. This way, each stage can be ex-
plained and be part of a model library, that later can be shared with the stakeholders in-
volved, or be imported by another model that encompasses further issues related to that
time frame. However, in order to understand and address better the concerns of each one
of the stakeholders, regardless of the number of lifecycle stages where they participate, it
may be convenient to have a subset of the model that contains the parts that are relevant
for them. Partitioning the model and presenting it as cross-sections is possible with the
use of packages or package diagrams. These views will filter the model according to the
aspect intended to address, or the point of view of the stakeholder in question.
This cross-sectional modeling style, together with the capability of the modeling lan-
guage to handle and show many views and viewpoints, is very useful in the context of
shared governance and multiple stakeholders. It can help to clarify the roles and respon-
sibilities of each group, or to understand the needs of other groups, and therefore identify
possible gaps. A single view of the elements that more than one type of stakeholders have
in common can be created, to facilitate collaboration. It can also allow external stakehold-
ers to obtain the information about the protective system that they need to know without
gaining access to restricted aspects of the company that it should not disclose, such as
classified information, confidential business information, and trade secrets.
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4.5 Advantages and drawbacks of having a computerized model, for maintenance
purposes, instead of a set of disjoint artifacts
The MBSE approach has many advantages over its document-based counterpart with
regard to maintenance. The artifacts in the document-based approach are a set of disjoint
manuals, spreadsheets and other text-based files that need to be updated every time the
system changes. It is very difficult to keep track of all the places in which the element
that needs modification appears, and it is expensive and time consuming to ensure that
all of the documents are properly updated. Any misses lead to inconsistencies among the
updated and outdated artifacts, which makes the latter obsolete.
Our model of protective systems was constructed following the MBSE approach. Any
changes made to an element of the model are automatically propagated to each and every
place where that element appears, which makes maintenance fast, easy and inexpensive,
and prevents inconsistencies caused by leaving one or more artifacts outdated by mistake.
However, this advantage also has its drawbacks. Changing an element of the model based
solely on one of the diagrams where it appears can be very dangerous, as it will instantly
modify all the other diagrams in which the element to update is present, where the change
may not always be desirable or perhaps even compatible, or could have an impact in other
elements that was not considered. Therefore, besides being cautious about who is given
the authority to modify the system model and the timing for the updates, managers should
always follow a proper procedure for the management of change, that includes impact
analysis. Once the change has been evaluated and approved, the model should be updated.
Also, if the change only took place in some instances of the model element and not in all
of them, special attention must be paid at the moment of the update to adjust the model
accordingly, to avoid the modification of all the instances at once35.
35For example, instead of renaming or modifying the properties of a block that is used in two or more
diagrams, which would propagate the changes throughout all the diagrams where it is used, replace it only
in the affected diagram with a new block with a different name and/or properties.
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4.6 Benefits for managers and regulators
This model is beneficial to managers for many reasons. It can lower the cost of main-
taining the documentation of the system. It gives them tools for impact analysis in manage-
ment of change activities, and consequently, to support decisions related to change. The
model can be used in training, and as a way to increase awareness and understanding of
the way in which the physical components of the protective system work, the information
flows in the management system, the operating procedures and policies established, the
requirements from laws, regulation, and recommendations from professional associations
and other exerts, the activities to perform with their respective inputs and outputs during
each lifecycle stage, and the notion of who the stakeholders are and what are their main
roles and concerns.
This model acknowledges governments and regulators as stakeholders of protective
systems. Nevertheless, it may also constitute a tool that will help them to mitigate moral
hazard, and perform their activities related to the preservation of public safety.
Regulators have the authority to enforce the adoption and use of protective systems.
They may also suggest, promote, or demand the use of MBSE to facilitate companies to
comply with prescriptive regulation, including OSHA PSM, EPA RMP, as other laws and
regulations set as requirements. Adopting MBSE practices may also facilitate audits and
inspections, as companies would be able to provide the authorities with the current status
of the company in terms of the implementation of protective measures, their processes and
equipment.
Furthermore, regulators acquire information and make it available to people who are
making social choice decisions. If regularly updated, this model may help them to keep
in hand the specific needs and concerns of the near neighbors and general population they
seek to protect, which can be summarized and captured as the views and viewpoints of
the external affected stakeholders. They need to know what kind of information they
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must obtain from safety-critical companies to answer the questions from the public and
mitigate moral hazard. Having a model that illustrates the structure and behavior of the
protective systems companies use could help them determine what information they should
request. Also, companies can be aware of the concerns of the external stakeholders, and
create packages with the information to disclose to them, including views of the model
understandable and relevant to those audiences, and satisfy the requests of regulators.
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
5.1 Conclusions
We have created a MBSE framework that advances the state of the art in safety-critical
protective systems, by integrating the management and governance dimensions, and offer-
ing further capabilities inherent to the MBSE approach. While it is still consistent with
the current characterization of protective systems as a group of protection layers used
in LOPA, our model is also suitable for combined design, operation, and regulation; it
reduces the cost of maintenance of its artifacts; and offers tools for simulation, impact
analysis, and management of change. Potential users include both enterprises and regula-
tors from the chemical process safety industry and the energy sector, and any other agents
invested in the design and management of protective systems.
This work significantly reduces the pitfalls of its document-based predecessors, by of-
fering an organic, visual model with traceable, integrated and consistent elements, whose
changes automatically propagate throughout every part where the modified element ap-
pears, instead of a set of disjoint texts, which are prone to errors, expensive to maintain,
or may become inconsistent and obsolete as the system evolves.
This framework includes system governance. It captures the management system that
supports the protection layers, as well as the internal policies and applicable regulations,
modeled through various blocks, requirements, activities, and information flows between
entities. Furthermore, this framework encompasses the views and viewpoints of multi-
ple owners, whose roles vary throughout the system lifecycle, and includes both internal
and external stakeholders. Therefore, it supports shared governance, and can be used by
multiple agents within and beyond the enterprise premises.
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For the same reason, it mitigates information asymmetry, as all of its users share the
same model. Nevertheless, it also renders the possibility to provide its specific audiences
with tailored views, relevant to them, at different levels of granularity, and filtered accord-
ing to their respective roles and concerns.
Besides modeling the physical components, management system, policy, laws and reg-
ulation, lifecycle, and stakeholders, our framework subsumes two very important aspects
in a protective system: impact analyses, and management of change. With regard to impact
analyses, it allows the users to identify where each model element is used throughout the
diagrams, what elements may affect it, and what other elements it may affect. It also shows
other types of existing relations among elements, such as generalizations, to inherit prop-
erties from the supertypes to the subtypes; composite and reference associations, to convey
aggregations and physical connections; and allocations, to assign behaviors to structures,
or establish cross relationships. Knowing these relations helps the users to assess possible
impacts in other parts of the model, before making any changes to its elements.
With regard to MOC, our framework models it as part of the management system,
hence, it includes the information exchanged with its other elements. MOC is also treated
in a special section of the model, which illustrates various MOC guidelines, from key
principles and essential features of MOC and the activities to perform during the design
and development of a MOC system, to the roles in a MOC team and their interactions as
changes are proposed, evaluated, and eventually authorized or denied. As part of the as-
sessment of possible impacts, we suggest a methodical use of the tools for impact analyses
provided in our model, that is, a realistic approach to manage multiple aspects of change.
This framework focuses mainly on protective systems’ architecture and governance.
However, as additional features, it also supports simulation and other analyses, which may
be of stochastic or deterministic nature. Potentially, every element in the system structure
modeled as a block may possess value properties, and mathematical equations imposed
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to them. Users can create instances to input values and solve the equations, or generate
thousands of scenarios to evaluate, linked to the model. Therefore, this framework subor-
dinates analytical modeling.
With these computational and analytical capabilities embedded in the model, the users
can develop and deploy parametric diagrams, as well as functions and scripts1 to compute
various indicators and perform analyses required by law, and integrate them in the system
model. Thus, besides constituting a tool for management and governance, impact analy-
sis and management of change, this framework may allow its users to comply with and
support the development of both prescriptive and performance-based regulation.
Standards are essential in engineering. The model of protective systems developed
in this research conforms to OMG’s and INCOSEs standards2. Furthermore, we believe
that our model may constitute a beginning point in the development of more sophisticated
standards for protective systems. It provides a medium that supports an implementation
of the management and governance, in addition to the physical components that constitute
the protection layers.
Ex-post civil liability is intended to compensate the victims after catastrophes occur,
while ex-ante safety regulation aims to induce protective measures to prevent catastrophes.
Yet, it is not unusual to find that standards and laws in safety-critical industries are often
created as a response to major incidents. Indeed, the development of both prescriptive and
performance-based regulation is difficult, and shifting towards the latter is also controver-
sial. Additionally, the role of regulators is not simply limited to issuing safety regulation
and verifying its compliance. Regulators synthesize and disseminate information, and
serve as an interface and mediator between companies and the general public. This model
1In MATLAB M-files or Mathematica c-Mathematica.
2OMG and INCOSE are two organizations that issue standards. They extended UML -an international
standard specified by the OMG and accepted as an ISO standard (ISO/IEC 19501)- and created SysML as a
standard modeling language for systems engineering applications.
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can be shared by both industry and regulators, and provides all of its stakeholders with
information regarding the structure, behavior, and parameters of protective systems, and
offers tools to assess possible impacts of planned and unplanned changes.
Based on the multiple benefits that the use of MBSE provides, at a very low expense, to
safety-critical companies and its many stakeholders, including regulators, and ultimately
the general population, we conclude it should be a regulatory requirement.
5.2 Future work
There are at least three paths for future work: Improving, extending, adapting and/or
refining this model using the same tools as so far, incorporating the use of other software
tools to enhance the model capabilities, and using the MBSE approach in non safety-
critical areas of application that can benefit from systems engineering.
5.2.1 Improving, extending, adapting or refining this model using the same tools
Our model can be improved in several ways. Virtually any block in the model can be
enhanced with further properties in displayed or hidden compartments, to include values,
constraints, operations, and receptions, if applicable.
Every use case and activity depicted in the diagrams can be explained in more detail
creating other behavioral diagrams that include subroutines or activities to be invoked; or
sequence diagrams that show who performs what activity in which order, and how the
entities that participate communicate with each other in a certain order; or state machine
diagrams that indicate the possible states of the elements of the model, such as the layers of
protection and their respective physical components, the status of a request for change, or
applicable activities within the management system, as well as what kind of events trigger
changes of state.
The emergency response layer, with its corresponding stakeholders, can be extended
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to include practices from the incident command system (ICS), which is “a particular ap-
proach to assembly and control of the highly reliable temporary organizations employed
by many public safety professionals to manage diverse resources at emergency scenes”
[4].
Several requirements can be added. Possible sources include federal and state laws,
other safety regulations, and best practices from professional associations. Besides its
text-based part indicating what shall or should be done, the relationships used in SysML
to establish traceability among requirements or traceability from requirements to the struc-
tures and behaviors in the system can be included.
Our model has the views and viewpoints of some representative stakeholders, but it
does not include views and viewpoints for all of them. Also, many more views and view-
points that encompass what various groups of stakeholders who belong to different su-
pertypes have in common could be created. Other packages with subsets of the model
partitioned following criteria distinct to the lifecycle stages or the condition of input or
output can also be created, assuming that doing this would have a valid purpose.
Adapting the model to a specific industry is also a viable alternative. It currently is
oriented towards process safety, but although some principles are the same, some physical
components, management system parts, policies, and laws and regulation may vary across
industries, or be country specific, and have different needs.
The model can be extended to encompass other CCPS guidelines3, or refined to focus
on fewer elements but in greater detail. Given our discussion about management failure as
the cause of protective systems failure, and the challenges brought by shared governance
and moral hazard, refining the model to focusing more on the management system and the
stakeholders is a reasonable alternative.
The example we used for showing the simulation capabilities to perform LOPA can be
3Our work was based mostly on 3 out of a over 100 publications.
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extended for the general case of n protection layers of any type. It may also be adapted to
include the effect of enabling conditions and conditional modifiers.
5.2.2 Incorporating the use of other software tools to enhance the model capabilities
Another path for future work consists of incorporating the use of other software tools to
enhance the model capabilities. The creator of the software we used in the construction of
our model has recently launched a newer version of a toolkit4 as an effort to integrate safety
and reliability analysis and allow the use of FMEA. LOPA is only one of the many analyses
in the qualitative-quantitative spectrum for safety and reliability. There is potential for
adding other analyses. This will allow to directly synthesize information for probabilistic
risk assessment (PRA) and quantitative risk assessment (QRA).
5.2.3 Using the MBSE approach in other areas
Finally, another possibility for future work consists of using the MBSE approach in
other areas of application that are not safety-critical, but can benefit from systems engi-
neering approach.
4MBSE toolkit.
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APPENDIX A
DIAGRAMS
Diagrams 1 through 55, discussed in section 4, are included as a separate file. See
Diagrams.pdf.
Diagram 1. Protection layers.
Diagram 2. Initiating causes.
Diagram 3. Protection layers exploded.
Diagram 4. Relief system with behaviors allocated to structures.
Diagram 5. Physical components.
Diagram 6. Management system.
Diagram 7. Asset integrity.
Diagram 8. Audits.
Diagram 9. Contractor management.
Diagram 10. Documents and documentation policies.
Diagram 11. Emergency planning and response.
Diagram 12. Hazard analysis.
Diagram 13. Human factors.
Diagram 14. Incident investigation.
Diagram 15. Management of change.
Diagram 16. Operating procedures.
Diagram 17. Pre-startup review.
Diagram 18. Process safety information compilation.
Diagram 19. Risk assessment.
Diagram 20. Training.
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Diagram 21a. Management System Flow (1/2).
Diagram 21b. Management System Flow (2/2).
Diagram 22. Inputs and outputs of MOC.
Diagram 23. Management Commitment MOC.
Diagram 24. Key principles and essential features MOC.
Diagram 25. MOC design structure.
Diagram 26. MOC design and development.
Diagram 27. MOC System design specification.
Diagram 28. MOC System development.
Diagram 29. Roles in MOC.
Diagram 30. Roles in MOC system implementation.
Diagram 31. MOC system roles.
Diagram 32. Request for change review and approval procedure.
Diagram 33. Requirement table.
Diagram 34. Policy.
Diagram 35. Laws and regulations.
Diagram 36. Laws and regulations table.
Diagram 37. Protection layers core attributes.
Diagram 38. Lifecycle.
Diagram 39. Activities by lifecycle phase.
Diagram 40. Inputs and outputs lifecycle.
Diagram 41. Inputs and outputs lifecycle (Tulip).
Diagram 42. Stakeholders.
Diagram 43. Stakeholders detailed.
Diagram 44. Stakeholders’ concerns per lifecycle phase.
Diagram 45a. Stakeholders’ viewpoints (comparison).
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Diagram 45b. Stakeholders’ viewpoints.
Diagram 46. Planning.
Diagram 47. Risk assessment phase.
Diagram 48. Design.
Diagram 49. Development.
Diagram 50. Installation.
Diagram 51. Operation and maintenance.
Diagram 52. Improvement.
Diagram 53. LOPA structure for simulation.
Diagram 54. Parametric diagram of LOPA for simulation.
Diagram 55. Instances of LOPA for simulation.
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APPENDIX B
MAIN MODEL ELEMENTS
A list of the main elements of the model presented in section 4 is included as a separate
file. See Main Model Elements.pdf.
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